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I. INTRODUCTION
Three employees of Mphasis, a business process outsourcing (“BPO”) firm which
runs call center services for Citibank’s US customers in Bangalore, India, were arrested
for allegedly siphoning $350,000 from the accounts of Citibank’s US customers. These
employees used their position which provided them access to Citibank customers to
induce four of them into giving out the personal identification numbers to their accounts,
allowing the employees to illegally siphon funds out of the customers’ accounts.1
Outsourcing is a growing trend among budget-conscious U.S. companies and institutions.
Information being outsourced includes personal data and confidential, proprietary
information. For example, Unisys Corp., a company that handles sensitive information
such as police records and databases for the US Department of Homeland Security, is
among scores of big corporations that farm out technology-related work to economically
1 While Mphasis maintained that its security procedures, especially detection and enforcement systems,
were adequate, industry analysts warned that this incident could heavily impact the offshoring industry in
India. Forrester Research, a US publicly traded independent technology and market research company that
focuses on the business implications of technology change, stated that the breach would have "far-
reaching" negative connotations for the offshore BPO industry and said that the high turnover of Indian call
centre staff makes it increasingly difficult to adhere to security processes and sufficiently check
backgrounds. A Forrester research note said: "While the center in Pune was BS 7799 (security
certification) and CMM Level 5 (quality certification) certified, the breach still occurred. Clients and
prospects should not be lulled into security complacency by the laundry list of certifications or process
changes that suppliers roll out. Customers are going to have to implement their own aggressive
requirements, such as eliminating writing instruments in their offshore centers and auditing bi-monthly to
ensure that the vendor is following mandated processes."Forrester also claimed offshore call centre growth
could drop by as much as a third because of security concerns, regulatory pressure and a consumer
backlash. Andy McCue, Indian Call Centre Staff in $350,000 Citibank Theft, SILICON.COM, April 11,
2005, available at
http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/offshoring/0,3800003026,39129426,00.htm (last viewed
November 30, 2005).
3efficient, low-wage countries such as India.2 In 2004 over 80% of US companies
considered outsourcing their information technology services to destinations such as
India.3 U.S. companies outsourced approximately $3 billion business processing work in
2005, reflecting a 65% increase from the previous year.4 The business processing work
included the transfer of personal data for processing insurance claims, credit card
transactions, and transcription of personal medical files.5 India’s outsourcing and
2 In April 2004 Unisys announced that it had set up a software development and back-office center in India.
After its initial round of hiring 2,000 people by the end of 2005, its employee base in India would double in
2-3 years. Unisys also plans to invest $180 million, increasing over time. Unisys has acquired a state-of-
the-art facility in the central business district in Bangalore, India, hired an experienced management team,
and commenced operations. Governments and public sector institutions are among Unisys' largest
customers. The company handles sensitive information such as police records and homeland security
databases, some of which will move to India. Unisys wards off criticism that this could lead to a
compromise on data security by claiming that it already out-sources work relating to sensitive data to some
Indian firms and has had no problems with their performance. S. Srinivasin, Unisys to Invest Heavily in
India, INFORMATION WEEK, April 28, 2004, available at http://networks.org/?src=infoweek:19202134 (last
viewed May 25, 2004). See also UNISYS, Unisys Chairman Anticipates Growth in India Resources,
available at http://www.unisys.co.in/about__unisys/news_a_events/03298525.htm (last viewed March 12,
2006).
3 See National Association of Software and Service Opportunities, “India: A ‘Secure’ Market for
Outsourcing” May 10, 2004, available at http://www.nasscom.org/artdisplay.asp?Art_id=2552 (last
viewed November 18, 2004).
4 India, China, the Philippines and Eastern Europe are among the countries taking on the bulk of this work.
Aryn Baker, In Search of the Next Bangalore, TIME, 43, June 26, 2006. According to Gartner, Inc., a
leading provider of research and analysis on the global information technology industry the vast majority of
offshore business process outsourcing (“BPO”) is around contact centers, including voice, e-mail and chat,
and the remainder for processing services. See Gartner Press Release 2004, available at
http://www.gartner.com/5_about/press_releases/asset_79327_11.jsp (last viewed December 1, 2005).
5 As many as 500,000 U.S. tax returns containing confidential information regarding individuals and
entities were projected to be prepared in India over the past two years. The predicted annual numbers are a
significant and rapid increase from 25,000 tax returns in the 2002 tax year and 100,000 for 2003. The
individual and business returns are being transferred to India for processing by not only sole-ownership
CPA firms, but also by some of the largest accounting firms in the U.S. See Liz Pulliam Weston, Your
Financial Secrets Are Headed Overseas, MSN MONEY, available at
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/FinancialPrivacy/P90682.asp?Printer (last viewed
December 1, 2005). Similarly, TransUnion, one of the three major credit bureaus, plans to send all
consumer disputes to a processing center in India. The company expects a significant increase in such
disputes as U.S. consumers take advantage of a new law requiring bureaus to provide free annual credit
reports, and says outsourcing the work is its most cost-effective option. Credit-bureau files contain highly
sensitive financial data, including Social Security numbers, credit account numbers, the amounts owed and
the payment history. David Lazarus, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Credit Agencies Sending Our Files
4electronic technology industry generated revenues of $36 billion in 2005, reflecting a
28% increase from 2004.6
As the wave of outsourcing swells, the issue of information piracy and data
security in India has come under greater scrutiny. The absence of appropriate statutory
measures in India is becoming increasingly of great concern to investors, corporations,
the legislature and the public in other nations.7 India is being urged to enact an adequate
data protection regime which dictates the appropriate parameters for the collection,
storage and use of personal data by private and government entities.8 Given the
international focus on India’s date protection scheme, it is merely a matter of time before
India enacts data protection laws. However, since intellectual property rights that lack
enforcement are worthless, the seminal issue that remains once the data protection laws
are in place is whether the laws will be enforced in such manner as to provide any
meaningful protection to data.9 The existing enforcement regime in India’s legal system
Abroad, Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/11/07/MNG4Q2SEAM1.DTL (last viewed December 1, 2005).
6 See, 10 Ways India is Changing the World, TIME, 41, June 26, 2006, citing World Bank, United Nations,
McKinsey and Co., PriceWaterhouseCoopers Report, Forbes and Government of India.
7 The United Kingdom’s Labor party Members of European Parliament affiliated with the Amicus trade
union in the U.K. announced in April that they would ask the European Union’s executive branch, the
European Commission, to protect British consumers whose personal data is being transferred to India,
warning that offshore outsourcing is "an accident waiting to happen." John Ribeiro, Indian Law May Satisfy
EU Data Protection Concerns, COMPUTERWORLD, April 21, 2004, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,92557,00.html (last viewed December 12, 2005).
See also Stuart Lauchlan, The Blame Game, THE AGE, May 3, 2005, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/20/1095651229660.html?from=storyrhs (last viewed December
12, 2005); Steve Ranger, Security Worries Hit Offshore Outsourcing, SILICON.COM, April 26, 2005,
available at http://management.silicon.com/itdirector/0,39024673,39129859,00.htm (last viewed
December 12, 2005).
8 The International Legal Framework for Data Protection and its Transposition to Developing and
Transitional Countries, GLOBAL INTERNET POLICY INITIATIVE (December 28, 2004).
9 See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491
(1997), citing Renato Ruggiero, Message from the Director-General of the World Trade Organization, in
The Intellectual Property and International Trade Law Forum: Special Issue 1998 XV (1998) ("Laws for
5is pitifully deficient, marred by interminable delays in moving matters through the
existing court system. India will be unable to provide adequate protection to data unless
a solution is found to address the court delays, and procedures established for expediently
prosecuting data protection breaches and compensating those harmed.
The paper recommends a system of specialized courts that deal with data
protection and other cyber infringement matters. After analyzing specialized courts in
various other jurisdictions and assessing their viability in India, a proposal is made for
specific features for a Cyber Infringement Court in India.
II. MODELS OF DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAWS
A. The Emergence of the Issue of Data Protection
The protection of data finds its roots in the individual’s right to privacy doctrine.10
The right to privacy has been explicitly contained in or has inferentially been found to
exist in the constitutions of most developed nations and the jurisprudential parameters of
privacy rights explored in various forums.11 However, the specific privacy issue related
the protection of intellectual property rights are of no account if intellectual property rights cannot be
effectively enforced."); Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protection in an
Age of Advancing Technology, 9 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 465, 482 (1994) (stating that "[i]ntellectual
property rights are useless without adequate enforcement provisions."); Arthur Wineburg, Jurisprudence in
Asia: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 25, 27 (1997) (stating that
enforcement of intellectual property laws is intractable problem); Arthur Wineburg & Edmund H. Mantell,
Managing Intellectual Property--An International Capital Asset, 99 Com. L.J. 366, 368 (1994) ("The value
of intellectual property depends upon the extent of one's rights to it are recognized and enforceable.").
10 PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 1 (2d ed. 2004).
11 The UK does not have a written constitution, and the right to privacy is not explicitly protected in the
UK. In 1990 the Calcutt Committee, charged with conducting an inquiry into press behavior in regard of
personal privacy, concluded that there was no satisfactory definition of privacy in the UK. However, the
Committee concluded that the right to privacy could be legally defined as "[t]he right of the individual to be
protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means
or by publication of information." Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Cm. 1102,
HMSO, 1990. A further attempt to define privacy came from the government of the UK in its Response to
the National Heritage Select Committee, where it stated that "[e]very individual has a right to privacy
comprising: (a) a right to be free from harassment and molestation; and (b) a right to privacy of personal
6to protection of personal data became an issue of growing concern in progressive nations
in the 1970s with the advent of computerized systems which could store and disseminate
large amounts of information with relative ease via automated processes.12 In the UK,
the Younger Committee on Privacy was instituted in the early 1970s to make
recommendations regarding the manipulation of computerized personal data.13 Similarly,
in the US the Data Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted.14 Subsequent protection of the
privacy of personal information was accomplished in the UK and US through various
legislative enactments.15 However, the gold standard for data protection was established
by the European Union in 1995 with the passage of EU Directive 95/46/EC.16 The
Directive established comprehensive legislation for data protection, setting a high
information, communications, and documents." Government Response to the National Heritage Select
Committee, Privacy and Media Intrusion, Cmnd. 2918, HMSO, 1995.
Although the US Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to privacy, this right has been found
implicit in provisions of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Ryan Moshell, … And
Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Towards
Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 357, 373 (Winter 2005). With regard to the
collection of private information, specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe, recognized the
"… threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
data banks or other massive government files." Id. at 373; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
Similarly, the Constitution of India does not expressly recognize the right to privacy, although it does
provide that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.” Constitution of India, Article 21, November 1949, available at
http://www.alfa.nic.in/constt/a1.html (last viewed June 17, 2006). A mere 14 years after the inception of
the Indian Constitution, the Indian Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy implicit in the Indian
Constitution pursuant to Article 21. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, 1 SCR 332 (1964).
12 Carey, supra note 11. Similarly, in the US the Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted to prevent the misuse of
personal data. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
13 Carey, supra note 11, at 1-3.
14 Infra note 33.
15 The UK passed the Data Protection Act of 1984. See Carey, supra note 11, at 3. The US has enacted
piecemeal legislation including the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Privacy Act of 1974. See infra note
33.
16 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, EU
7standard for non-EU member states to meet. The EU’s regime impacted non-EU member
nations directly because under the Directive data could not be transferred to states which
did not provide adequate standards for protection. The EU standard for data protection is
briefly described below, and the impact of this legislation on other nations – the US and
India – is examined in subsequent sections.
B. The European Standard
EU Directive 95/46/EC (“Directive”) was adopted in October 1995 for the
purpose of mandating standards within the then 15-member European community for the
protection of personal data.17 As with all EU directives, the Directive was not self-
implementing. It required all EU member states to enact, no later than October 25, 1998,
national legislation giving effect to its provisions to protect individual citizens’ rights to
privacy and to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of its citizens’ personal
information both within and outside the EU.18
Directive 95/46/EC, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm
(last visited August 6, 2006).
17 Id. See also, Kevin Bloss, Raising or Razing the e-Curtain?: the EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 645 (Summer 2000), citing W. Scott Blackmer et al., Online
Consumer Data Privacy Regulation in the U.S., Elec. Banking L. & Com. Rep. Apr. 1999, at 1.
18 Bloss, supra note 18, citing Henry J. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False Alarm?, 51 Fed. Comm.
J.L. 811 (1999).
At present, all 25 members of the EU have enacted legislation giving effect to the provisions of the
Directive. See, Directive, supra note 17; implementing data available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last viewed August 6, 2006).
Should a problem with implementing the Directive have arisen, the European Commission would step in
to resolve non-compliance by the EU Member State. The implementation of legislation in the EU is the
primary role of the European Commission, an independent executive body consisting of 25
Commissioners (one from each EU Member State). The Commission, intended to be a body independent
of Member States, is not permitted to take instructions from the government of any Sate. Maintaining
such independence permits the Commission to represent the interests of the citizens of the EU in its role as
the upholder of legislation and treaties. See, generally, EU Institutions and Other Bodies, available at
http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm (last viewed August 6, 2006).
8The Directive proposes a broad-brush ‘umbrella’ legislation encompassing all
sectors of industry and all instances of collection and use of personal data. The Directive
protects “ … the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular
their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data ….”19 The
processing of data can be wholly or partially by automatic means.20 Personal data
encompasses information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person who “ …
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity” (emphasis added).21 "Processing of personal data"
is defined as any operation performed upon personal data “… whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction
… .”
22 In essence, all personal data held must comply with the following principles:
 Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, with discosure of the
controller of the data, and disclosure of the purpose for which it is being collected;
 Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes;
19 Directive, supra note 17, Chapter I, Article 1, 1.
20 Id. at Chapter I, Article 3, 1.
21 Id. at Chapter I, Article 2 (a).
22 Id. at Chapter I, Article 2 (a).
9 Personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed;
 Personal data must be accurate and, where necessary kept up to date.
Reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that inaccurate, misleading or incomplete data
is erased or rectified;
 Personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of the data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which data were collected or
for which they are further processed. Member States are required to establish appropriate
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or
scientific purposes. 23
With regard to enforcement of the data protection laws, the Directive requires
EU Member States to provide judicial remedies to any individual whose rights to data
privacy are violated. It also requires that Member states adopt suitable measures to
ensure the implementation of the Directive, and to impose sanctions on the data
collectors and processors for violations of any section of the Directive.24 Several EU
Member states, including the UK and Italy have adopted specialized courts with
exclusive jurisdiction over intellectual property matters.25
A critical aspect of the Directive is its impact on the global economy. Data
transfer to third countries or regions outside the EU is permitted only if the recipient
23 Id. at Chapter II, Section I, Article 6. See also, Carey, supra note 11, at 51-63.
24 Directive, supra note 17, at Chapter III, Articles 22, 24.
25 See generally, infra notes 131-156 and accompanying text.
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nation provides an “adequate level of protection.”26 Pursuant to this case by case
approach under Article 25 of the Directive, the adequacy of the level of protection
afforded by a third country is assessed by the European Commission which is empowered
to produce a list of countries which ensure an adequate level of protection by virtue of the
third country’s domestic laws or international commitments for the protection of private
lives, basic freedoms and rights of individuals.27 Factors such as the nature of the data,
the purpose and duration of the processing operation, the country of origin, the country of
final destination, the rules of law in place in the third country, the professional rules and
security measures complied with in that country are considered in reaching an
26 Any meaningful analysis of adequate protection must comprise the two basic elements: the content of the
rules applicable, and the means for ensuring their effective application.
In the absence of a finding of adequacy, a data controller can still transfer personal data to such a country
by using one of the eight alternative procedures, such as using an approved contract, or obtaining the
consent of the data subject (the individual to whom the personal data relates). Transfer of personal data to
the third country may proceed if (i) the data subject has given his or her unambiguous consent to the
transfer; (ii) the transfer is necessary either for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is
party, or the transfer is necessary for the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response to
the data subject’s request; (iii) the transfer is necessary to conclude a contract, or to perform a contract,
between the data controller and someone other than the data subject, in cases where the contract is entered
into at the request of the data subject, or where the contract is in the interests of the data subject; (iv) the
transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for the establishment,
exercise or defense of legal claims; (v) the transfer is necessary to prevent the vital interests of the data
subject, including injury or other damage to the data subject’s health, or to prevent serious damage to his or
her property; (vi) the personal data to be transferred are an extract from a statutory public register, i.e. a
register established by law as being available for public consultation, or as being available for consultation
by persons with a legitimate interest in its contents. Directive, supra note 17,Article 25(1), 26(1).
27 See, Directive, supra note 17, at Article 25(6). One difficulty of this case by case approach is that many
countries outside the EU do not have standardized, homogenous protection in all economic sectors. For
instance, many countries have data protection laws in the public, but not in the private sector. In the United
States the sectoral approach to legislation makes the situation especially difficult: for example, specific
laws exist for specific areas such as credit reporting and health industry, but not in others. Countries which
have federalist systems, including Canada and the US, add an extra dimension of difficulty since the
various states that form the federation may have different laws. Whether the protection afforded to a data
transfer was representative of the entire country or only of a particular sector or state is a question that must
be addressed in such countries. Report of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION WORKING PARTY ON THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA,
Free Movement of Information and Data Protection, including international aspects, 1997, available at
http://www.privacyexchange.org/tbdi/EUID/EUadeq.html (last viewed July 30, 2006).
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“adequacy” determination.28 The fear of a prohibition on transferring data to a third
country, with far reaching economic and trade repercussions, has encouraged certain third
countries to adopt data protection measures similar to those of the EU.29 Adoption of
such laws, it is hoped, will lead to a finding of adequacy by the European Commission,
thereby preserving trade and economic relations of the third country with the EU. At
present, the European Commission has concluded that the laws of Switzerland, Isle of
Man, Canada, Argentina, the US and Guernsey provide adequate protection.30
Article 26(2) of the Directive provides an exemption to the “adequacy” finding,
opening up the possibility of ad hoc solutions to find adequate protection for data. The
foremost alternative avenue is the creation of contractual arrangements between parties to
fill in the gaps to ensure adequacy. The EU Commission has approved “model contracts”
to assist data controllers in this regard, and such contracts would automatically fall under
this provision. The Data Protection Commissioner also has the power to endorse “model
contracts” specific to the transferring countries’ circumstances, as well as the power to
approve particular contracts or other arrangements that provide satisfactory safeguards. 31
28 See Directive, supra note 17, at Article 25(2).
29 Latvia, hopeful that it would attain EU membership, was quick to enact legislation on data protection
which encompassed the mandate of the Directive. Switzerland and Norway have also promulgated
Directive-compliant legislation. Ryan Moshell, supra note 12, at 388, 389.
30 Data Protection- European Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of
Personal Data in Third Countries, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm (last viewed December 11,
2005). In the case of Canada, the approval is qualified. While there are several data protection laws in
Canada, the European Commission’s decision relates only to those data regulated by the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000. Carey, supra note 11 at 107. In the case of the
US, the EU and the US have entered into a “safe harbor” arrangement, See supra notes 36-43 and
accompanying text.
31 Procedurally, however, the Directive deals with these Article 26 contractual cases very differently from
Article 25 cases. Under Article 25 Member States are required to notify each other and the Commission in
cases where adequate protection has not been ensured and the transfer has therefore been blocked. By
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Non-EU states who have not been found adequate with regard to their data protection
regime primarily rely on contractual arrangements to continue their business transactions
with EU Member States.
The US has circumvented the processes established by the Directive, neither
meeting the EU’s adequacy standard, nor conducting commerce through contractual
arrangements with EU Member States. The unique arrangement between the US and EU
Member States, the “Safe Harbor” arrangement, is described below.
C. The US Compromise
As explained above, the Directive mandates and EU nations have adopted a
comprehensive legislation approach which, for example, requires creation of government
data protection agencies, registration of data bases with those agencies, and in some
instances prior approval before personal data processing may begin. In contrast, the U.S.
approach to data privacy is “sectoral,” in that it relies on a mix of legislation, regulation,
and self regulation. Starting with the Fair Credit Reporting Act - the first legislation at a
Federal level in the US to regulate private sector use and disclosure of personal
information - and later the Privacy Act of 1974 which was enacted due to concerns about
breaches of privacy arising from computer databases, the US has a system of data
contrast, under Article 26 the obligation is reversed: Member States are required to inform the Commission
and other Member States of each authorization granted. This legislative arrangement addresses the fear that
contractual solutions have inherent problems, such as the difficulty of enforcement of contractual rights by
a data subject. Directive, supra note 17, at Article 26(2). See also, Report of the EUROPEAN
COMMISSION WORKING PARTY ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO
THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA, Free Movement of Information and Data Protection,
including international aspects, 1997, available at
http://www.privacyexchange.org/tbdi/EUID/EUadeq.html (last viewed July 30, 2006).
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protection that is governed sector by sector.32 At a state level, numerous laws protect the
privacy of individuals.33
The US was concerned that its “sectoral” approach to data protection, quite
different from the EU’s ‘umbrella’ approach, would not meet the EU’s standards of
“adequacy.” Fearing a disruption of commerce between the US and EU Member States
that would hurt both businesses and consumers, the US Department of Commerce entered
into negotiations with the European Commission in 1997 in an attempt to resolve the
looming trade disaster.34 In the summer of 2000 the U.S. Department of Commerce and
the European Commission unveiled a "Safe Harbor" framework designed to bridge the
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy protection.35 On July 27,
2000, the European Commission determined that the US Safe Harbor privacy principles
provided adequate protection under Article 25(6) of the Directive.36 The finding of
32 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, enacted in 1970, has been amended in 2003 by the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act. See also, The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
33 For example, the privacy laws in California include California Penal Code Section 502 which relates to
computer crimes, prohibiting the intentional access of any “… computer system or computer network from
the purpose of devising or executing any scheme … to defraud or extort or obtain money, property or
services with false or fraudulent intent, representations, or premises; or to maliciously access, alter, delete,
damage, or destroy, any computer system, computer network, computer program or data;" California
Elections Code Sections 2188 and 2194 regulate the confidentiality of information such as the residential
address, telephone number, occupation contained in voter registration records; California Civil Code
Section 1799.3 prohibits video stores from disclosing its customers’ personal information, including sales
and rental information; disclosure of medical records to third parties is prohibited without written consent
of the patient under California Civil Code Section 56. See Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
Privacy Laws of the State of California, available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/callaw.htm (last
viewed April 4, 2006).
34 Aaron Lukas, Safe Harbor or Stormy Waters? Living With the EU Data Protection Directive, CATO
INSTITUTE, CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES, Publication 16, October 30, 2001, at 2.
35 Id.
36 Article 25(6) of the Directive provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Commission may find … that a third
country ensures an adequate level of protection … by reason of its domestic law or of the international
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adequacy is binding on the Member States of the EU, and permits US organizations
which participate in Safe Harbor to be deemed adequate under the Directive. By
eliminating the need for approval from the EU prior to data transfers, the process of
transferring data to US Safe Harbor entities is streamlined, and continued flow of data to
these US companies is assured.37 Organizations formed in the US are eligible to
participate in the Safe Harbor agreement.38 Safe Harbor is essentially a self-regulatory
approach whereby US entities which self-certify that they are compliant with the
principles of Safe Harbor.39 The Safe Harbor principles track the principles contained in
the Directive, closing any loops that may exist between the US sectoral laws and the
requirements of the Directive. The seven Safe Harbor Principles are:
commitments it has entered into … for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of
individuals.” Directive, supra note 17, at Chapter IV, Article 25(6), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm (last viewed December 21, 2005).
37 US Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor, available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last viewed August 6, 2006).
38 See Jan Dhont, María Verónica Pérez Asinari, and Prof. Dr. Yves Poullet et al., Safe
Harbour Decision Implementation Study, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, April 19, 2004, at 13,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/studies/safe-harbour-
2004_en.pdf (last viewed August 6, 2006), stating that an organization must be
established in the US to be eligible for Safe Harbor. US subsidiaries formed in countries
other than the US are ineligible. See also Commission Decision, Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles, available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/DecisionSECGEN-EN.htm (last
viewed August 6, 2006).
39 These self-certifying entities are listed on the US Department of Commerce website as organizations that
EU Member States may transfer data to. US Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor, supra note 38. See
also, EUROPA, European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, Freedom, Security and Justice,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-faq1_en.htm
(last viewed March 30, 2006). The self-certifying US entity is required to re-certify every year thereafter.
See US Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor, supra note 38.
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 Conspicuous notice must be provided to the data subject regarding the purpose
of the data collection and use, as well as regarding complaint mechanisms available to the
data subject; 
 Choice must be offered to the data subject to opt out if the data is being used
for a purpose that is different than its original purpose, or if data is to be transferred to
third parties. The data subject is given an opt-in choice if the data is sensitive, relating to
race, religion, ethnicity etc.;
 Onward transfer of personal data to third parties may only be done consistent
with the principles of notice and choice;
 The data subject must be permitted access to his or her information collected
by the US entity;
 The security of the personal data must be maintained by exercising reasonable
precaution to ensure that data is protected from loss;
 The integrity of data must be maintained, ensuring that it is relevant to the
purpose for which it was collected, accurate and current;
 The self-certifying US entity must provide mechanisms for enforcement of the
Safe Harbor principles. Data subjects must be provided a forum for filing complaints,
and a dispute resolution procedure established to respond to grievances of the
consumer.40
40 Id.
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US organizations may incorporate the seven Safe Harbor principles in various
ways. For instance, organizations may adopt safeguards deemed necessary by the EU for
transfers of personal data from the EU to the US by incorporating the relevant safe harbor
principles into agreements entered into with parties transferring personal data from the
EU. In the alternative, where an organization is subject to US statutory, regulatory,
administrative or other body of law (or body of rules issued by national securities
exchanges, registered securities associations etc.) that also effectively protects personal
data privacy, it qualifies for Safe Harbor to the extent that there is a nexus between its
activities and the specific laws or rules.41 With regard to enforcement of data privacy
laws, given the US’ sectoral approach, violations of data privacy in the US may be
prosecuted by the Federal or state authorities in corresponding courts, or by the
administrative agency under whose jurisdiction the sector is being regulated or
legislated.42 Although the US has adopted a number of specialized courts, at present none
deals exclusively with data privacy matters.
41 Id.
42 For instance, in an administrative action brought by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), an internet
company that provides online shopping cart software to online merchants was charged with wrongful
disclosure of personal information about its customers to marketers. The FTC entered into a settlement with
the defendant, under the terms of which the defendant was barred from use of the personal data the
company has already collected, as well as from making future misrepresentations about the collection, use,
or disclosure of personally identifiable information. The settlement also required the company to ensure
that consumers received a clear and conspicuous notice before their personal information was disclosed to
other companies for marketing purposes. In the Matter of Vision I Properties, LLC, doing business as
CartManager International, File No. 042 3068, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.htm (last viewed April 4, 2006). See also, In the Matter of
Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc., FTC File No.: 042 3153; In the Matter of Nationwide Mortgage Group,
Inc., and John D. Eubank, FTC File No. 042-3104, Docket No. 931. available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/11/ns.htm (last viewed April 4, 2006), where the FTC brought administrative
charges against two mortgage companies for violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (“GLB”) Safeguards
Rule. The Safeguards Rule, which implements the security requirements of the GLB Act, requires
financial institutions to have reasonable policies and procedures to ensure the security and confidentiality
of customer information. The companies charged with the violation, Nationwide Mortgage Group, Inc. and
Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc., were charged with not having reasonable protections for customers'
sensitive personal and financial information.
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Early analysis of the Safe Harbor arrangement indicates mixed success and of the
Safe Harbor arrangement. While the number of self-certifying US entities has continued
to grow, the enforcement mechanism provided by these companies has come under fire.
Less than 50 companies had chosen to be placed on the Safe Harbor list a year after its
inception.43 This number had multiplied significantly four years later, with 842
companies self-certifying on the US Department of Commerce site’s Safe Harbor list on
December 15, 2005. Of these 842 self-certifying companies, 728 organizations had self-
certified within the last twelve months that they were “current” with their certification
status. 114 organizations had not certified or re-certified in the last year, or had notified
the Department they no longer adhered to the safe harbor framework, and were identified
as “not current” in their self-certification. Almost 14% of the companies self-certifying
were not current in their compliance: organizations that are “not current” are not assured
the benefits of Safe Harbor.44 Should the number of companies failing to re-certify or
which are not current with their compliance continue to increase, the success of Safe
Harbor will be questionable.
A Safe Harbor Implementation Study conducted at the request of the European
Commission acknowledged the increased participation by US companies in Safe Harbor
and briefly noted a handful of other positive trends, while criticizing the Safe Harbor in
length on numerous grounds.45 The privacy policies of companies has been severely
43 Aaron Lukas, supra note 35.
44 US Dept. of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, supra note 38.
45 In addition to noting the increased participation by US companies, the study also briefly acknowledged
four additional positive trends related to the Safe Harbor. A considerable number of countries listed in the
Safe Harbor list certified that they would cooperate with the European data protection authorities,
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criticized due to their inaccessibility and lack of clarity. Companies’ representations that
they had instituted privacy programs were generally found to be dubious, unsupported,
and inconsistent with the Safe Harbor privacy program definition. Finally, the reviewers
were critical of the alternate dispute resolution mechanism adopted by US companies on
the grounds of inadequacy, lack of procedural transparency and sanctioning regimes.46
Breaches in data security, such as that reported by Lexis-Nexis in March 2005
involving personal information of 32,000 US residents,47 as well as by the shoe retailer
DSW Inc. which reported that credit card numbers of people who shopped at 103 of its
175 stores had been obtained by hackers, have not helped build confidence in the US data
protection regime. U.S. companies reported more than 60 data breaches between January
and September 2005, and Congress, as well as a number of state legislatures, responded
with dozens of pieces of legislation, many modeled after a 2003 California law requiring
companies to notify affected customers about data breaches.48 In November 2005 the
indicating a positive attitude. Some companies provided information in their privacy policies which was
not strictly required by the Safe Harbor principles. US data processors generally affirmed the existence of
security measures. Finally, the report noted that Safe Harbor adherents generally provided their full contact
information on the Department of Commerce self-certification, while concurrently noting negatively that
the privacy policies did not always contain adequate contact information). Jan Dhont et al., Implementation
Study, supra note39, at 59.
46 Id. at 62-77
47 Fraud artists assumed the identities and used the passwords of legitimate customers to download
customer data including names, addresses, driver license numbers and social security numbers. Jonathan
Krim and Robert O'Harrow Jr., Data Under Siege ID Thieves Breach LexisNexis, Obtain Information on
32,000, WASHINGTON POST, March 10, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A19982-2005Mar9.html (last viewed December 22, 2005).
48 California Civil Code Section 1798.29 was enacted in acknowledgment of the fact that the privacy and
financial security of individuals was increasingly at risk due to the ever more widespread collection of
personal information by both the private and public sector. At the Federal level, the far-reaching IDENTITY
THEFT PROTECTION ACT was introduced in July 2005. S.1408, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005). S.1408 would
require entities to develop and maintain a scheme for the security of sensitive personal data collected or
transferred by the entity. This legislation is yet to be enacted. Similarly, the FINANCIAL DATA
PROTECTION ACT of 2005 was introduced in October 2005. H.R. 3997, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2005). This
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Senate Judiciary Committee was referred a bill that would require companies with data
breaches to notify affected customers, and would set up rules for the U.S. government's
use of private databases.49 The bill would require businesses holding the personal data of
more than 10,000 U.S. residents to conduct risk assessments and implement data-
protection policies. Failure to implement security plans could expose businesses to fines
up to $35,000 per day.50 Despite the outcry over the dozens of breaches this year,
Congress has been reluctant to pass a data breach notification bill, partly because of
growing concerns that most of the bills would take a step backward from existing state
laws.51
Whether packaged in one piece of legislation as the EU Directive is, or whether in
a more piecemeal sectoral fashion, both the US and the EU have well-defined and
comprehensive laws on data security and privacy. The EU members have adopted
comprehensive data protection law covering all sectors. The US has sector-specific laws
and laws at the federal and the state level. Despite the presence and strength of laws in
the US and EU, breaches such as the Lexis-Nexis failure have occurred with regard to
data transferred electronically. Comfort can be derived from the presumption that
bill, as yet to pass, would mandate a strong Federal standard whereby entities would be required to notify
consumers of breaches involving potential identity theft.
49 PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT of 2005, S.1789, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).
50 Id.
51 See remarks of Senator Leahy on May 25, 2006 that “[r]ather than work on our privacy and identity theft
legislation, including the Specter-Leahy Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005 … we are being
directed to another divisive debate on a proposed constitutional amendment [to keep to a political timetable
for raising divisive matters in the runup to the November elections].” 152 CONG. REC. S 5217 (2006). See
also, Grant Gross, Data Breach Bills Unlikely to Pass Before 2006, Frequency of Notifications One
Sticking Point in Legislation, PC WORLD, November 14, 2005, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,123515,00.asp (last viewed December 22, 2005).
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enforcement of the laws in the US and the EU will serve to deter future criminals, and to
offer recourse to the victims of data piracy. Although critical due to the infusion of IT
business to India, as the remainder of this paper discusses, such comfort is available
neither with regard to the data protection laws in force in India today, nor as to the
enforcement of existing or prospective laws.
D. Current Data Protection Laws in India
India does not currently have a specific data protection law. Data protection and
privacy are given scattered and rather sparse coverage by existing laws. The existing data
protection laws, discussed in some detail below, are strewn in laws pertaining to
information technology, intellectual property, crimes, and contractual relations. Under
increasing pressure from BPO operations and call centers in India that handle large
volumes of data from the US and Europe, the Indian government is contemplating the
passage of a comprehensive law protecting data. Despite the urgency of the matter and
pressure from internal and external fronts, India has delayed enactment of legislation for
several years.52 The form of the legislation - whether umbrella, sectoral or a combination
of the two - which will provide optimal protection for cross-border data processed in
India has been under discussion for several years. At this point, it appears likely that
India’s Information Technology Act of 2000 (“IT Act of 2000”) will be amended to
incorporate laws that provide comprehensive protection to data.53 This approach, which
52 An amendment to the IT Act of 2000, offering enhanced protection to data, was close to enactment in
2004, after 7 years in the making; unfortunately this proposed amendment was shelved due to a change of
India’s Central government. Andy McCue, Offshore Data Protection Law Flounders, SILICON.COM,
available at http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/offshoring/0,3800003026,39130054,00.htm
(last viewed December 12, 2005).
53 THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, Order under Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs
(Legislative Department), June 9, 2000. The IT Act of 2000 covers cyber and related information
technology laws in India. It deals essentially with authentication of electronic records and electronic
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continues to be discussed as the probable solution to India’s data protection dilemma,
does not entail enactment of a separate comprehensive law to deal with data security and
privacy issues across all industries, as has been the case with the EU.54
Until such time as India enacts adequate data protection laws, the current laws in
India are the only protection offered for data privacy violations. These existing laws,
including the IT Act of 2000 which is the most pertinent since it pertains specifically to
the use of computer data, and their shortcomings are discussed below. It is observed that
unlike the Directive which imposes liability on each participant within the chain of
command of the data who failed to protect the sanctity of the data, India’s existing laws
only prosecute those individuals who directly violate laws related to computer systems or
copyright.55 Entities are exempt for breaches of data privacy unless such a violation was
made knowingly.56 Unlike the Directive which protects data breaches by limiting its
collection and use, the Indian laws do not specify conditions under which data can be
collected and used.57 Where liability may be found by stretching the existing laws to
signatures, lacking specific provisions relating to privacy of data, data interception and computer forgery.
Report of the Expert Committee, Proposed Amendments to Information Technology Act 2000, Department
of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, Government of
India, August 2005, available at http://www.mit.gov.in/itact2000/Summary-final.doc (last viewed August
2, 2006). See also, Sufia Tippu, Indian IT Act to be Amended to Net Cyber Criminals, IT WIRE, July 13,
2006,
available at http://www.itwire.com.au/content/view/4957/945/ (last viewed August 2, 2006).
54 Another alternative that was discussed, but is unlikely to be enacted, is an ‘umbrella’ data privacy law
similar to the EU Directive, which allows for sectoral adjustments. This proposal would encompass the
EU’s comprehensive and expansive legislation, while retaining the flexibility of the US’s sectoral
approach. This proposal was offered by Rodney Ryder, a member of committee considering data
privacy/protection laws in India. A copy of Mr. Ryder’s March 1, 2006 email which addresses this issue is
in the files of the author of this paper.
55 Infra notes 60, 85 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 61, 62, 85, 86 and accompanying text.
57 The Directive mandates five principles in accordance with which data must be collected and processed,
including the requirement that the collection of data must be specific to the purpose for which it is
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cover breaches of data privacy, penalties afforded to victims are inadequate in a
transnational context.58 The existing Indian laws and their deficiencies are addressed in
further detail below.
1. IT Act of 2000
The IT Act of 2000, Section 43(b) affords cursory safeguards against breaches in
data protection.59 The scope of Section 43 (b) is limited to the unauthorized
downloading, copying or extraction of data from a computer system, essentially
unauthorized access and theft of data from computer systems. Section 43(b) is limited in
scope, and fails to meet the breadth and depth of protection that the EU Directive
mandates. The law creates personal liability for illegal or unauthorized acts, while
making little effort to ensure that internet service providers or network service providers,
as well as entities handling data, be responsible for its safe distribution or processing.
Furthermore, the liability of entities is diluted in Section 79 of the act, which inserts
“knowledge” and “best efforts” qualifiers prior to assessing penalties.60 A network
service provider or intermediary is not liable for the breach of any third party data made
available by him if he proves that the offence or contravention was committed without his
knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence or contravention.61 Similarly, while Section 85 of the Act does invoke entity
collected, and such purpose must be disclosed to the data subject. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See also, generally, infra note 60 and accompanying text.
58 Infra notes 65-69, 87 and accompanying text.
59 IT Act of 2000, supra note 54, at Ch. IX Section 43(b).
60 IT Act of 2000, supra note 54, at Ch. XII Section 79.
61 Id.
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liability, such liability is limited to the specified illegal acts under the IT Act of 2000
which does not offer broad protection of data.62 Section 85 does extend liability to key
employees (managers, directors, officers etc) of the company for intentional or negligent
acts that result in a breach of the specific violations under the IT Act of 2000.63
With regard to damages available in the event of a breach of data privacy, Section
43(b) is deficient in that the maximum penalty for this breach is monetary compensation
in the paltry amount of approximately two hundred and twenty thousand dollars
($220,000).64 The maximum monetary damages available for a breach that can
potentially be several times more, is clearly inadequate in a transnational context. The
law makes no differentiation based on the intentionality of the unauthorized breach, and
no criminal penalties are associated with a breach of Section 43(b). The more limited
crimes of computer hacking and tampering are considered criminal offenses under the IT
62 Id. at Ch. XIII Section 85. Section 85 (1) provides that
(1) Where a person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act
(emphasis added) or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder is a company,
every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of,
and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as
well as the company, shall be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person
liable to punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.
(Emphasis added).
63 Id. at Section 85 (2). Section 85 (2) provides that
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of
any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder
has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken
place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part
of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director,
manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the
contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
(Emphasis added).
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Act of 2000: Section 65 offers protection against intentional or knowing destruction,
alteration, or concealment of computer source code with. Section 66, while offering no
clear language which protects personal data, offers limited protection when personal data
is destroyed, deleted or altered. Both Sections 65 and 66 are punishable with criminal
penalties including jail time of up to 3 years or a monetary penalty of up to $440,000.65
In addition to Sections 65 and 66, although Chapter XI of the IT Act of 2000 specifies
criminal penalties for a laundry list of illegal acts, no such recourse is available for the
broad realm of breaches of personal data security.66 In addition to the protections
discussed above, Section 72 of the IT Act of 2000 offers some protection for breaches of
confidentiality and privacy.67 Non-consensual disclosure of confidential information is
punishable by imprisonment for up to 2 years, or a maximum fine of approximately
$220,000.68
64 Id. at Section 43(b), 43(h).
65Id. at Sections 65, 66. Section 65 provides that “[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally conceals, destroys
or alters or intentionally or knowingly causes another to conceal, destroy or alter any computer source code
used for a computer, computer programme, computer system or computer network, when the computer
source code is required to be kept or maintained by law for the time being in force, shall be punishable with
imprisonment up to three years, or with fine which may extend up to two lakh rupees [approximately
$440,000], or with both.”
Section 66(1) provides that “[w]hoever with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause
wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person destroys or deletes or alters any information residing
in a computer resource or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means, commits
hack.” Section 66(2) provides for penalties similar to Section 65 (see supra).
66Id., at Ch. XI.
67Id., at Ch. XI, Section 72, Section 72 provides that “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act or any other
law for the time being in force, any person who, in pursuance of any of the powers conferred under this
Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, has secured access to any electronic record, book, register,
correspondence, information, document or other material without the consent of the person concerned
discloses such electronic record, book. register, correspondence, information, document or other material to
any other person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both.”
68 Id.
25
In contrast to the IT Act of 2000, the EU Directive envisions much broader
violations associated with breach of data security than does the limited sphere of the IT
Act of 2000.69 As described previously, the EU Directive provides for protections in the
entire chain of control of data, and creates systems of security and associated penalties
within the various stages of data processing.70 For instance, the Directive prescribes
limits to the collection of personal data, requiring that a purpose for the data collection be
articulated.71 The Directive also requires that data must be obtained by lawful and fair
means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject;
personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the
extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.72
The 1980 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal
Data promulgated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) are also instructive, demonstrating that a large void exists in India’s IT Act of
2000. A reformation of the IT Act of 2000 should encompass the principles contained in
the Directive, and the parallel OECD principles related to limitation of data collection,
data quality, specified purpose, use limitation, security safeguards, individual
participation and accountability.73
69 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
70 Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71 Supra note 24, and accompanying text.
72 Id.
73 Principles of the Directive are discussed supra at note 24, and accompanying text. See also,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Information Security and Privacy, Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data , available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last viewed August
6, 2006). The OECD Guidelines were formulated in anticipation that member nations, including the US,
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Further, in matters of trans-national data protection the IT Act of 2000 is deficient
in that jurisdiction for cases arising out of violations lies in India. A special tribunal is
established by the Central Government, and all matters arising out of the IT Act of 2000
are within the jurisdiction of this Cyber Appellate Tribunal.74 While the IT Act of 2000
is diligent in establishing a tribunal headed by a qualified judicial officer, the difficulty in
accessibility to this tribunal is stark in a trans-national setting. Injured parties who are
non-residents of India would have to adjudicate disputes in a foreign jurisdiction,
incurring the related expense ad inconvenience thereof. The limited parties from whom
recourse can be sought, limited circumstances under which remedy may be established,
and the limited nature of the damages is even more bare when the avenues for recourse
and compensatory sums are viewed from a perspective of third party nationals.
2. Additional Sources of Legal Protection in India
In addition to the scattered provisions of the IT Act of 2000, the Indian criminal
laws and intellectual property laws also afford limited protection for personal data. As
illustrated below, these provisions contain many gaps making the overall existing data
protection scheme in India inadequate. Given this sparse and scattered protection, the
most prevalent mode of data protection is contractual arrangements between the data
collector, the transferee and the data subject. These additional data protection regimens
are addressed below.
had agreed to pass legislation pertaining to data protection and privacy. The Guidelines were meant to
address the threat that disparities in national legislations could hamper the free flow of personal data across
national borders. It was anticipated that the flow of data would greatly increase with the innovation and
spread of computer and communications technology.
74 IT Act of 2000, supra note 54, at Ch. IX, Section 46, 47, and Chapter X, Sections 48 et seq.
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a. Indian Criminal Laws: The Indian criminal laws do not specifically
address breaches of data privacy. Under the existing Indian Penal Code, liability for such
breaches must be inferred from tangentially related crimes. For instance, Section 403 of
the Indian Penal Code imposes criminal penalty for dishonest misappropriation or
conversion of “movable property” for one’s own use.75 Movable property has been
defined as property which is not attached to anything, and not land: although no
jurisprudence has developed on this interpretation, arguably, movable property
encompasses computer-relayed data and intellectual property.76 Wrongful
misappropriation of data, or conversion for one’s own use may, under this interpretation,
be punishable as a crime in India.
In addition, Indian Penal Code Section 405 provides criminal penalties for
criminal breach of trust. Section 405 provides that “[w]hoever, being in any manner
entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates
or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property
in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal
breach of trust".” Liability under Section 405 extends to employees and agents of the
violator, and the crime is punishable by imprisonment and/or fine.77
75 INDIA PEN. CODE Section 403.
76 INDIA PEN. CODE Section 22, defining “movable property” as “… corporeal property of every
description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything. which is
attached to the earth.”
77 INDIA PEN. CODE Section 405 et seq.
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Section 424 of the Indian Penal Code provides criminal liability for dishonest or
fraudulent concealment or removal of property. Accomplice liability is also envisioned,
with jail and fines imposed on the first party or accomplice.78 Sections 420 of the Indian
Penal Code may also offer some protection for failure to adequately protect data. Section
420 pertains to dishonest delivery of property to a third person.79
While it was likely not envisioned at the time of enactment that the criminal laws
referenced above would be used to offer protection for misuse of data, given the
importance of the data processing industry to the Indian economy and seriousness of the
harm from breaches in data privacy, Indian courts may extend the protections offered by
these criminal statutes. The adequacy of the remedies under India’s criminal laws in a
trans-national context remains questionable, as is the case with the remedies under the IT
Act of 2000.80 Similarly, jurisdictional issues remain problematic- the cost, delay and
inconvenience associated with foreign nationals bringing actions in Indian courts offsets
the availability of the recourse.81
78 INDIA PEN. CODE Section 424 provides that “[w] hoever dishonestly or fraudulently conceals or removes
any property of himself or any other person, or dishonestly or fraudulently assists in the concealment or
removal thereof, or dishonestly releases any demand or claim to which he is entitled, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
79 INDIA PEN. CODE Section 420 states that “[w] hoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
80 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text..
81 Supra note 75.
29
b. Intellectual Property Law Protection
Computer software (including computer programs, databases, computer files,
preparatory design material and associated printed documentation, such as users'
manuals) have copyright protection under Indian laws. Computer programs per se are not
patentable, being patentable only in combination with hardware.82 Thus in India, by past
practice and under current laws, copyright is the preferred mode of protect for computer
software.
A 1994 amendment of the Copyright Act of 1957 brought sectors such as satellite
broadcasting, computer software and digital technology under Indian copyright
protection. Protection of intellectual property rights in India was considerably
strengthened in 1999. In addition to major legislation pertaining to patent and trademark
laws, the Indian Copyright Act of 1957 was amended to make it fully compatible with the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.83 Known as the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1999
(“Indian Copyright Act”), this Act came into force on January 15, 2000.
82 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 3(k) excludes "mathematical methods, business methods
or algorithms" from the scope of patentability. See also, Manisha Singh, India's Patent law – is it TRIPs
compliant?, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, available at
http://www.managingip.com/?Page=17&ISS=17631&SID=524402 (last viewed August 6, 2006).
83 The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) is an international treaty which sets down minimum standards for most forms of intellectual
property regulation within member countries of the WTO. Specifically, TRIPs deals with copyright and
related rights (ie. rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting organisations);
geographical indications (including appellations of origin); industrial designs; integrated circuit layout-
designs; patents (including the protection of new varieties of plants); trademarks; and undisclosed or
confidential information, (including trade secrets and test data). TRIPs also specifies enforcement
procedures, remedies, and dispute resolution procedures. The obligations under TRIPs apply equally to all
member states, however developing countries are allowed a longer period in which to implement the
applicable changes to their national laws. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last viewed December 20, 2005). See also,
Wikipedia, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at
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The Indian Copyright Act prescribes mandatory punishment for piracy of
copyrighted matter commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Section 63B of the
Indian Copyright Act provides that any person who knowingly makes use on a computer
of an infringing copy of computer program shall be punishable for a minimum period of
six months and a maximum of three years in prison.84 Fines in the minimum amount of
approximately $1250, up to a maximum of approximately $5,000 may be levied for
copyright infringement of computer software. An enhanced penalty is available for
second or subsequent convictions- imprisonment for a minimum term of one year, with a
maximum of three years, and fines between $2,500 and $5,000.85 As with penalties
under the IT Act of 2000, these penalties are inadequate in a transnational context.86
In addition to the strengthening of copyright laws, a number of measures have
been taken in the past few years to strengthen the enforcement of copyright laws in India.
Such measures include education and building awareness of copyright issues in the public
sector (through state government offices and central government ministries), as well a
private business (including company stakeholders, enforcement agencies, professional
users like the scientific and academic communities and members of the public). The
government has initiated a number of seminars and workshops on copyright issues whose
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreement_on_Trade-Related_Aspects_of_Intellectual_Property_Rights (last
viewed December 20, 2005).
84 India Copyright Act, 1957, Chapter XIII, Section 63A, 63B.
85 Id. Actual knowledge of the infringement is a pre-requisite to a finding of criminal liability. The actual
knowledge standard protects bona fide users of software; in the case of copyright there are quite a large
number of works which are in the public domain that a person can use freely, and it is natural for many to
presume that such works are outside the copyright regime. See, EMBASSY OF INDIA, Policy Statements,
Intellectual Property Rights in India, available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/ipr/ipr_2000.htm
(last viewed December 21, 2005).
86 Supra notes 62-54 and accompanying text.
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participants include law enforcement personnel as well as representatives of industry
organizations. Enhanced and specialized programs have been established to give law
enforcement officials training in copyright issues. Judicial officers have been selected and
trained to deal with these intellectual property violations.87
c. Contractual Relations: Private contractual terms have been used as a
means for filling the gap left by the IT Act of 2000 and other laws in India. Until a
tighter data protection legal regime is in place, the US and other countries out-sourcing to
India are relying upon contractual obligations to impose obligations for protecting and
preserving data. There is growing recognition within the out-sourcing industry that
contractual obligations do not provide the most efficient or effective recourse. In the
event of a breach of the security of data, getting effective remedy under the contractual
obligations is time consuming and often insufficient. Contractual recourse can be sought
only against the contracting party in violation of the contracted terms; the actual wrong-
doer may not be liable in damages or for criminal penalties. Having appropriate statutory
protection with associated penalties, sanctions, damages and other remedies would likely
act as a more appropriate deterrent against the breach of data privacy.88
87 The Indian government claims that as a result of the numerous measures to protect copyright initiated by
the Indian government, enforcement activity has significantly increased. As per the data relating to
copyright offenses available with the National Crime Records Bureau, the number of copyright cases
registered went up from 479 in 1997 to 802 in 1998. The number of persons arrested increased from 794 in
1997 to 980 in 1998. The value of seizures has gone up from $720,000 (approximately) to $1,870,000 in
1998. See, EMBASSY OF INDIA, Policy Statements, Intellectual Property Rights in India, available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/ipr/ipr_2000.htm (last viewed December 21, 2005). By contrast, the
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a private organization representing the U.S. copyright-
based industries in bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve international protection of copyrighted
materials, finds that in the over fifteen years that IIPA has been studying copyright issues in India, there
have fewer than twenty convictions for copyright piracy. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ALLIANCE, 2005 Special 301 Report, available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/2005SPEC301INDIA.pdf
(last viewed August 6, 2006).
88 Even though the government has delayed the implementation of a legal framework for prosecution of
data and privacy breaches, Indian BPO companies have implemented processes such as the BS7799
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3. Reform of Indian Data Protection Regime
The Indian system of data protection can be best described as a web – many
protections are offered through various sources and the web traps some violations, but
gaps and holes remain through which others slide through. In order to address the
inadequacies of the IT Act of 2000 and the miscellaneous laws providing protection to
data, Indian businesses and the Indian government drafted amendments which would fill
the void. Although passage of the amended law covering data protection was anticipated
in 2004, due to a change in government in 2004 the proposed legislation was shelved by
the new government.89 Whether the IT Acts is amended, or alternative legislation
enacted to protect the sanctity of transferred data, the new laws must offer effective
enforcement in order to conform to the “adequacy” norms of the Directive and the Safe
Harbor privacy principles of the US. After the new rules are in force, India will enter
discussions with the EU to get it to recognize India as a country that offers an adequate
level of protection for personal data.
Enactment of law that facially provides protection is but one step in the fight to
maintain the sanctity of data. Even if satisfactory data protection laws are in place in
India, the real question in assessing the adequacy of the law is whether it will be effective
in deterring wrongful data piracy. Two issues are examined in this context: First, the
standard for information security management of the London-based British Standards Institution. Standards
such as BS7799, and the ISO17799 standard for information security of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), based in Geneva, restrict access to certain data, or limit the quantity of data to be
made available to employees of BPO and call centers. Security measures include limitation of software
made available to the processor’s workstation, denial of internet access so that information cannot be
relayed by this means (for example, credit card information cannot be emailed via the internet), as well as
creation of paperless offices so that data cannot be copied out. John Ribeiro, India Poised to Tighten Data
Protection Law, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, April 22, 2004, available at
http://www.computerweekly.com/Article130076.htm (last viewed December 12, 2005).
89 See supra note 53.
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general issue whether punishment deters crime. If it is concluded that appropriate
sanctions do prevent and deter crime, the second issue is whether wrongful appropriation
of data will be prosecuted in India sufficiently so as to be a deterrent. If the Indian
enforcement system is found inadequate, alternative enforcement processes must be
established to prosecute violations of data privacy. A system of specialized courts
instituted in India to prosecute cyber infringement cases, including data privacy
violations, is essential for this purpose. These post-enactment are discussed in Section III,
below.
III. POST-ENACTMENT ISSUES IN INDIA
India has some laws already in place, and is headed towards adoption of more
comprehensive legislation to protect data. The existing and proposed legislation, India’s
IT Act of 2000, the copyright laws and contractual arrangements, each carry remedies of
monetary sanctions and/or imprisonment. Once amendments strengthening the current
data protection laws are enacted, it remains to be seen if these remedies provide adequate
protection against violations of data protection. If the laws are adequate, satisfying the
stringent EU standards, it is absolutely vital to prosecute the data protection crimes in an
efficient and expedient manner so as to act as a deterrent against future commission of
crime. These issues are considered in the next two sections of this paper. However, even
before the questions regarding punitive measures are addressed, it is important to know
whether the enquiry is an appropriate one. The initial question whether punishment, in
fact, deters individuals from committing crime is studied below.
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A. Is Punishment a Deterrent Against Wrongful Conduct?
The empirical study of the effects of deterrence on wrongful conduct is an area of
ongoing inquiry and lively debate.90 A study of punishment and deterrence conducted in
1973 by Issac Erhlich is highly influential in the field of criminology.91 Analyzing data
over a period of three decades, Erhlich concluded that crime varied inversely with the
probability of imprisonment and the average time served.92 The proposition that crime is
a negative function of (1) certainty of punishment, (2) severity of punishment and (3) the
speed of punishment is now a theory that has gained acceptance by criminal theorists.
Frequency of crime tends to decrease as punitive responses to crime increase in these
three contexts.93 For the purpose of this paper which focuses on enforcement issues, the
first and third factors, certainty of punishment and speed (or celerity) of punishment are
of special significance, and are discussed below.94 The proposed legislative changes in
90 Although the bulk of the analysis is focused on the deterrence of crime, it can easily be analogized to,
and parallel conclusions drawn in regard to non-criminal misconduct. See, Michael K. Block & Vernon E.
Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary
Penalties and Risk, 24 J. Legal Stud. 123 (1995).
91 Does Punishment Deter?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, August 17, 1998, citing Isaac
Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
81, 1973, pp. 521-64, reprinted in William Landes and Gary S. Becker, eds., ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS
OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1974).
92 Id.
93 STEPHEN E. BROWN, FINN-AAGE ESBENSEN & GILBERT GEIS, CRIMINOLOGY, EXPLAINING CRIME AND
ITS CONTEXT, 193 (5th ed. 2004).
94 An additional factor which is addressed only briefly in this paper is the personal characteristics of the
wrong-does, and his propensity to commit crimes. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A
Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497, 1545
(1974). See also, Rudolph J. Berger, Economic and Historical Implications for Capital Punishment
Deterrence, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 437, 441 (2004).
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India contemplate severe monetary and jail sentences.95 In contemplation of this, the
severity of the punishment factor is not addressed in this paper.
Of the three identified factors, the certainty of punishment is seen to be a much
greater deterrent than the severity of punishment.96 It is estimated that a fifty percent
increase in the probability of incarceration prevents about twice as much violent crime as
a fifty percent increase in the average term of imprisonment.97
For crimes involving data piracy, which are categorized as non-violent or property
crimes, the certainty of punishment is a much greater deterrent as compared to violent
and sexual crimes.98 Should businesses’ internal crime detection processes, law
enforcement mechanisms and the judicial processes be efficient and diligent in
prosecuting computer-related crimes, the likelihood that data piracy will be deterred is
great.
The second important factor in data piracy deterrence is the celerity or speed of
punishment. It has generally been theorized and accepted by contemporary
criminologists that the more speedily that punishment follows the commission of crime,
95 In India where the per capita income at current prices US $349, the average fines for copyright protection
are approximately 14 times the per capita income. Monetary sanctions in India’s IT Act of 2000 are
similarly daunting, and the proposed changes are expected to be even more arduous. These fines impose a
significant burden on an individual and would act as a strong deterrent. EMBASSY OF INDIA, Policy
Statements, Intellectual Property Rights in India, available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/ipr/ipr_2000.htm, (last viewed August 6, 2006).
96 But see Id. at 1550, noting that “ … it seems possible to conclude, contrary to some of the previous
statistical studies, that severity does have a significant deterrent effect (and one more important than that of
certainty) for several of the crimes examined.” (Emphasis added).
97 Does Punishment Deter?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, August 17, 1998, citing Michael
K. Block and Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and
Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 24, January 1995, 138;
Albert J. Reiss Jr., and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds., Understanding and Preventing Violence (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences, 1993), p. 6
98 Id.
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the more useful it is. To prospective offenders who are deliberating the commission of a
wrongful act, the prospect of a swiftly-imposed enforcement, and therefore imminent
punishment, creates a psychological cause-effect connection between the contemplated
criminal behavior and the resulting punishment. This cause-effect connection strengthens
in direct proportion to the celerity or speed with which the effect follows the cause.99
Therefore, the swifter the probability of punishment, the less likely a wrong-does will be
to commit an act of data piracy.100
The certainly and speed of punishment are critical factors in determining the
effectiveness of sanctions. The two factors can be seen to interlink and function together
in evaluating deterrence. These findings are critical to the Indian data protection scheme
since they provide impetus for reform of the insufficient, lethargic and slow Indian law
enforcement and judicial processes. Since crime is unlikely to be deterred under the
deficient Indian system described in sub-section B below, the Indian enforcement
mechanism must be given a major overhaul. A system of specialized courts dedicated to
cyber infringement matters would resolve the deficiencies of the Indian enforcement
system.
99 Rudolph J. Berger, Economic and Historical Implications for Capital Punishment Deterrence, 18 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 437, 441 (2004), citing Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments 55-59
(Henry Paolucci trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1963) (1764).
100 Convincing as the above data related to certainty of punishment and celerity of punishment is, it is naïve
to assume that all persons follow the same calculus in making choices about whether to commit or refrain
from committing a crime. In recent years criminologists have identified numerous individual
characteristics that may be related to deterrence. For example, whether an individual shows preference for
impulsive behavior or present gratification, versus delayed gratification could determine whether he can be
deterred from committing a crime. The impulsive person would be more inclined to commit a crime since
he would reflect less on the consequences of his act and therefore be less affected by them. Similarly, a
person who is stimulated by the thrill of taking risks would be more driven by the excitement of the
commission of the crime and less deterred by sanctions; an anti-authoritarian would consider rules and
associated sanctions a threat to his right to self-regulate and would likely be less deterred by them. Id. at
199.
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B. Delays and Inconsistencies in the Indian Enforcement Scheme
Assuming that the existing and proposed legislation in India sufficiently addresses
the severity of punishment factors by imposing harsh monetary sanctions and jail
sentences for misconduct related to data privacy breach, the issue to be considered in the
Indian context are (1) certainty of punishment and (2) speed of punishment.
The Indian enforcement and judicial systems are fraught with delays, inefficiency
and lethargy in both civil and criminal actions.101 The Indian civil justice system exhibits
a general failure to accommodate the demands of a newly market-oriented society.
Typified by inefficient court administration, judicial passivity to an extent that is
inappropriate in an adversarial legal system, and protracted, often discontinuous, trials,
typify the legal process in India.102 Inefficiency in court administration denies timely
access to legal dispositions. Excessive control by litigants places those seeking legal
redress in an unequal position because respondents can abuse and delay the resolution
procedures with impunity. Finally, the unavailability of alternatives to litigation clogs the
system. Many cases awaiting judgment are no longer contentious, and long-awaited
judgments are often difficult to enforce.103
A peek into the window of civil litigation presents a disheartening picture.
Records of new filings are kept by hand.104 Documents filed in court are frequently
101 Hiram E. Chodosh, Stephen A. Mayo, A.M. Ahmadi & Abhishek M. Singhvi, Indian Civil Justice
System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1, 3
(Fall-Winter 1997-1998).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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misplaced or lost.105 Lawyers crowd the courtroom and wait for their cases to be called.
Once a matter is called, resolution is frequently delayed due to innumerable adjournments
resulting from witness unavailability, absence of a party, witness or lawyer, or document
unavailability.106 Recordation of court proceedings is done by a judge who summarizes
testimony for a court reporter, thereby losing specificity, precision and detail.107 A case
will not likely appear before the same judge for the duration of its cycle: transfer of
judges occurs are a more expedient pace than judicial resolution.108
Unfortunately, the criminal court system offers no better picture. In India’s
overburdened court system, it can take up to seven years to complete a criminal case.109
The challenge posed by the Indian enforcement system is that the criminal system is
burdened by corruption, inefficient court procedures, lack of training, and inordinate
delays. The gigantic trans-national problem of copyright infringement in India is
illustrative of the initiatives that can be promulgated, and the results that can be expected.
Following a strengthening of copyright laws a decade ago, a number of measures were
taken by the Indian government to strengthen the enforcement of the laws. Such
measures included training of enforcement officers, judicial officers and business
personnel to build awareness of copyright issues, and assist in the detection of copyright
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 IIPA, Special Report, supra note 88.
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violations, and enforcement of copyright laws.110 The results of the initiatives has been
mixed: the Indian government claims that as a result of the numerous measures to protect
copyright initiated by the Indian government, enforcement activity has significantly
increased. As per the data relating to copyright offenses available with the National
Crime Records Bureau, the number of copyright cases registered went up from 479 in
1997 to 802 in 1998. The number of persons arrested increased from 794 in 1997 to 980
in 1998. The value of seizures has gone up from $720,000 (approximately) to $1,870,000
in 1998.111 The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a private organization
representing the U.S. copyright-based industries in bilateral and multilateral efforts to
improve international protection of copyrighted materials, finds that in the over fifteen
years that IIPA has been studying copyright issues in India, there have been fewer than
110 Presumably as a result of the numerous measures to protect copyright initiated by the Indian
government, enforcement activity has significantly increased. As per the data relating to copyright offenses
available with the National Crime Records Bureau, the number of copyright cases registered went up from
479 in 1997 to 802 in 1998. The number of persons arrested increased from 794 in 1997 to 980 in 1998.
The value of seizures has gone up from $720,000 (approximately) to $1,870,000 in 1998. See, EMBASSY
OF INDIA, Policy Statements, supra note 88.
The situation, presumably prior to the mid-1990s which saw an amendment to the Indian Copyright Act
and enhanced enforcement mechanism, was described in the following dismal terms: “The Indian court
system presents a challenge to copyright enforcement. The Indian High Courts address copyright
infringement only after cases meet exhaustive administrative requirements. The most difficult problem,
however, lies at the lower criminal judiciary level where copyright cases remain the lowest priority. India’s
criminal system is extremely slow and cumbersome, which delays the litigation process and becomes an
expensive endeavor for producers, directors, and actors who seek immediate enforcement against copyright
violators. Trial delays also increase because investigators are frequently transferred to remote locations for
other projects, and once they are relocated, securing their presence for a given case is difficult. Due to these
delays, the investigators' evidence for the case is often misplaced or unusable; this helps the defendant
obtain a motion to postpone the hearing or trial and further delays the litigation process. The slow,
burdensome criminal court system has been detrimental not only to the enforcement of copyright laws on
the national front, but also internationally … .” Priti H. Doshi, Copyright Problems in India Affecting
Hollywood and "Bollywood," 26 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 295 (2003).
111 See, EMBASSY OF INDIA, Policy Statements, supra note 88.
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twenty convictions for copyright piracy. 112 Therefore, while the detection of copyright
violations may have dramatically increased and the number of arrests may have gone up
significantly, the number of convictions remain poor. This points once again to the
bottleneck at the courts. The state of the judicial system, with its inherent delays remains
an unresolved burden.
The above discussion presents a gloomy picture of the prospects of enforcement
of data protection laws in India. Even if appropriate data protection laws are enacted,
they will likely be inadequate until enforcement issues are addressed. Monetary and
criminal sanctions contained in the laws can deter instances of crime if the enforcement
system is certain and speedy.
Given the problems of the Indian judicial mechanism and the fears that it will be
grossly inadequate to deal with the added burden of cyber breaches (including criminal
and civil breaches of data privacy), alternate means of enforcement must be envisioned
and incorporated into the system of data protection in India.
C. Alternatives to Current Enforcement Regime in India
Once the data protection laws in India are strengthened, the general legal system
must be tweaked to address data protection enforcement. Proposed remedies to fix the
enforcement void include establishment of a national centralized enforcement body
dedicated to, and trained in electronic data piracy and enforcement. This national body
must be given jurisdictional authority to enforce across state borders. In addition, it is
essential to have specialized local police enforcement units which are specifically trained
and maintained to recognize instances of and enforce actions against data piracy crimes.
112 See, IIPA, Special Report, supra note 88.
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Finally, it is vital to adopt meaningful court reform to decrease burdens, costs and delays
and ensure that cases are concluded promptly with deterrent penalties and damages.
Specialized judicial avenues of enforcement are the logical transition that India
must make due to the inability of the regular court system in India to deal with the
additional volume of cases that cross-border crimes will generate. The solution is the
establishment of specialized cyber infringement courts with jurisdiction over all
violations related to intellectual property, including data privacy (hereinafter referred to
as “Cyber Infringement Courts”).113 The specific model for such a court depends on
factors such as local customs and practices (including local procedural considerations),
113 International tribunals dealing with cyber infringement are a second alternative. Given the cross border
nature of cyber breaches, and the ever increasing global interactions pertaining to intellectual property
(including data privacy), these international tribunals may be an appropriate and effective solution in the
future. In addition to the more commonly recognized areas of intellectual property (patents, trademarks,
copyright, trade secret and unfair competition), data protection, database protection and privacy rights are
areas related to, and encompassed within a broad definition of intellectual property. Cyber infringement
courts may logically encompass all or a subset of these areas of intellectual property. See, generally,
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW COMMITTEE,
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF SPECIALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (September
2005), p. 6, available at http://www.comml-
iba.org/attachment/articles/88/Final_International_IP_Survey_15-09-05.pdf (last viewed April 9, 2006).
This model may draw from the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, an instrument for
international co-operation which was signed on November 23, 2001 by 26 Council of Europe member
States and the four non-member States which had helped with the drafting (Canada, Japan, South Africa
and the United States). The Convention requires parties to criminalize certain conduct that is committed
through, against, or related to computer systems. Such substantive crimes include offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems, as well as using computer systems
to engage in conduct that would be criminal if committed outside the cyber-realm, i.e., forgery, fraud, child
pornography, and certain copyright-related offenses. The Convention also requires parties to have the
ability to investigate computer-related crime effectively and to obtain electronic evidence in all types of
criminal investigations and proceedings. By providing for broad international cooperation in the form of
extradition and mutual legal assistance, the Cybercrime Convention is intended to remove or minimize
legal obstacles to inter-national cooperation that delay or endanger a State’s investigations and prosecutions
of computer-related crime. See, The Convention on Cybercrime, a unique instrument for international co-
operation, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, November 23, 2001, available at
http://www.coe.int/NewsSearch/Default.asp?p=nwz&id=802&lmLangue=1 (last viewed April 9, 2006).
However, even at just a procedural level such international governance and enforcement would necessitate,
among other things, that participating States (1) enter into a treaty subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the international cyber crime tribunal, and (2) create a common set of rules or laws, including
enforcement procedures, that would govern the area of intellectual property. Given the time consuming
and costly nature of this solution, burdened with conceptual and procedural hurdles, this potential response
is not a viable solution in the immediate future, and is not addressed in this paper.
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cyber infringement caseloads, number of judges, and monetary considerations.114
Specialized courts established in Thailand, the US, and for a limited purpose Italy, are
studied below with special attention to these factors. Several specialized Cyber
Infringement Courts of both civil and criminal jurisdiction with features drawn from
those established in Thailand, the US and Italy, are the necessary solution to India’s
overburdened system. Suggested features for this specialized Cyber Infringement Court
system are recommended in Section IIIB(3)(ii) below.
1. What Are Specialized Courts?
Specialized courts are courts of limited, explicitly focused subject matter
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional feature means not only that the backlog in the regular
courts gets reduced, but also that cases that fall within the jurisdiction of specialized
courts get heard in an expedient, efficient manner. Another important feature of
specialized courts is that, in contrast to judges of general jurisdiction courts who hear
cases that span the entire spectrum of law, judicial officers who serve on specialized
courts are typically experts in that field of law.115
Specialized courts can offer advantages related to time and efficiency in several
ways. First, such courts foster judicial efficiency by virtue of the fact that since experts
are appointed to the bench in these courts, not much effort is expended in developing
expertise to adjudicate the matters brought before them. This has the natural result of
expediency in the processing of cases. The second advantage, a corollary to the first, is
115 IBA, International Survey, supra note 114, at p. 2.
115 CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE AND RESEARCH
PROGRAM, SPECIALIZED COURTS: A CONCEPT PAPER (June 25, 1996), p. 1, available at
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/conceptpapers/speccourts/spc1.html (last viewed April 9, 2006).
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that lawyers appearing in specialized courts expend less effort, and ultimately less client
resources, in laying the foundational aspects of these complex areas of the law. In courts
of general jurisdiction attorneys typically develop the legal framework by providing
extensive background material through submissions to the court, in the form of written
briefs etc., to ensure that the judge has access to as much information as possible to
adjudicate the case appropriately.116 Since judges in specialized courts are experts in the
field and do not need this education, this directly results in focused submissions, resulting
in time and cost efficiency to the attorneys and their clients. A third advantage of
specialized courts is the uniformity in decision making and consistency in the application
of the law. The expertise of the specialized court judges results in thoughtful, predictable
and uniform rulings well grounded in the law, leading to certainty of decisions and
containment of potential grounds for filing lawsuits. Therefore, courts are less likely to
be burdened and overcrowded as fewer prospective litigants find grounds for bringing a
dispute to court.117 A fourth related advantage is that given the soundness of the
judgments of the court of initial jurisdiction (the specialized court), appeals are less likely
to be filed. Therefore, the burden on appellate courts is also likely to be significantly
reduced. Fifth, efficiency of time and procedure is also a likely result of the specialized
nature of the proceedings. Judges who are experts in the field can better assess the time,
procedure and substance required to move a case forward. Improved case management
techniques, include establishing pretrial deadlines, the discovery process, ruling on
116 Id. at p. 12,referring to generalist judges as “novices at everything and experts at nothing.”
117 The uniformity of decisions and predictability in the case law can also be a cause for inefficiency.
Counsel may determine that their chance of success in the specialized court is low due to the case law
developed in these courts; a strategic decision may be made to posture the case in such a way that it falls
within the jurisdiction of a general court. The effect of this is an unnecessary overburdening of the general
court system, and an under-utilization of the specialized courts. See id. p. 14.
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dispositive motions, moderating settlement proceedings, scheduling and conducting
trials, etc. would result from the specialized judge who is familiar with the issues
presented and would more effectively control the flow of litigation than a generalist
judge. Finally, specialized courts can be used to support the generalized courts. Due to
the fluctuating and often erratic nature of court filings and proceedings, it is conceivable
that a specialized court may have a small caseload at times. In such instances,
specialized courts can lend a helping hand to overburdened courts of general
jurisdiction.118
Due to the numerous advantages offered by specialized courts they are a feature
of the judicial systems of many countries, although their structure and function may vary.
The first question to be addressed is the feasibility of specialized courts in India. This
complex and involved question is merely touched upon in this paper in Section IIIB(2)
below, since it would necessitate a comprehensive feasibility study beyond the scope of
this article.
If specialized courts are a viable solution to the Indian enforcement dilemma, then
the next question is what model of specialized Cyber Infringement Courts would best fit
India’s needs. The specialized intellectual property courts of Thailand, Italy and a
selection of the numerous specialized courts of the US are generally reviewed in Section
IIIB(3)(ii) below with a view to proposing specific features of a specialized Cyber
118 Id. pp. 10-14. But see, id. pp 14-16 regarding a discussion on some of the disadvantages of specialized
courts. One criticism stems from the fact that due to the expense associated with establishing these courts,
specialized courts may be geographically placed at further apart than courts of general jurisdiction.
Litigants would have to bear the burden and cost of travel to these scattered specialized courts, creating
barriers to justice.
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Infringement Court system with jurisdiction over civil and criminal intellectual property
matters in India.
2. Are Specialized Courts a Feasible Solution to India’s Problem of
Enforcement of Data Protection?
Specialized courts pose special problems for developing countries such as India.
A major hurdle, and in fact the greatest barrier, is the expense factor associated with
establishment of and maintenance of these courts. These costs are not only a one-time
cost, but are also recurring in nature. The establishment expenses include consultation
expenses related to policy research and drafting and design of new legislation, training of
judicial officers, court and enforcement staff, administrative costs, costs of acquiring and
furnishing buildings to situate the specialized courts. Recurrent and ongoing costs must
be reflected in a larger budget allocation for agencies enforcing the legislation, ongoing
training of court and administrative personnel, and hiring and retention of specialized
judges, court and administrative agency staff.119
While the inherent expense of establishing specialized courts is significant, India
is one of the developing nations that can afford, and indeed, must afford the support of its
computer industry. India’s gross domestic product was 8.4% in 2005, topping $800
billion. It has grown at the second fastest rate in the world over the past three years, an
average of 8%.120 India’s projected continued high economic growth, fueled in large part
by the growth in the computer-related industry, is the incentive for investing in a
119 IBA, International Survey, supra note 114, at p. 7.
120 See, Alex Perry, Bombay’s Boom, TIME, 41, June 26, 2006. See also, 10 Ways India is Changing the
World, TIME, 41, June 26, 2006, citing World Bank, United Nations, McKinsey and Co.,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Report, Forbes and Government of India.
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specialized court system that addresses breaches to the industry that is instrumental to
India’s incredible economic success. In other words, India cannot afford to ‘bite the hand
that feeds it.’ If India is to meet economists’ projections and develop into one of the
largest economy in the world within the next three decades, it is essential that it “ … must
expedite socio-economic reforms and take steps for overcoming institutional and
infrastructure bottlenecks inherent in the system.” 121 The question, then, is not whether
India can afford to establish specialized courts to address its enforcement problems. The
appropriate question is whether India can afford to not invest in the security of its
computer industry. If prompt enforcement is essential to deter crime, and if India’s
current judicial system is already overburdened, lethargic and inadequate, then the
answer is clear. India must invest in a system of specialized courts to promptly and
adequately adjudicate data privacy violations.
3. If Specialized Courts Can Help Resolve India’s Judicial Backlog,
What Are the Appropriate Features Of This Alternate System?
Crafting an appropriate model for a specialized cyber infringement court in India
requires some understanding of the current court structure in India. The features of
India’s judicial structure are set forth in sub-section (i) below. Next, specific features
121 Manoj Pant, Start of a new era for India?, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, April 7, 2006, available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1480585.cms (last viewed April 9, 2006).
At a meeting of finance ministers from Asia and Europe, global economic output was predicted to expand
to an astounding rate of 4.5 percent. This growth is “ … driven to a significant extent by rapidly
developing economies such as … India, where growth is three or four times faster than in industrialised
countries.” Brian Love and Jan Strupczewski, Ministers predict hot world economic growth in 2006,
REUTERS UK, April 9, 2006 , available at
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=businessNews&storyID=2006-04-
09T153341Z_01_L08773825_RTRUKOC_0_UK-ECONOMY-EU.xml (last viewed April 9, 2006). See
also, India Economy Overview, ECONOMYWATCH.COM, available at
http://economywatch.com/indianeconomy/indian-economy-overview.html (last viewed April 9, 2006).
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from the courts of Thailand, Italy and the US are analyzed in subsection ii, and finally
proposed features for specialized courts in India are discussed in subsection (iii) below.
i. Indian Judicial System
The Indian Judiciary, along with the Legislative and Executive branches, are the
three institutions of state governance in India.122 Similar to the US Constitution, the
Indian Constitution has conferred upon the Indian Judicial branch the power of review of
legislative and executive action. Enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the
India Constitution has been entrusted to the Indian judiciary. The Indian Constitution
provides for a single integrated system of courts to administer both federal (or Union)
laws, and State laws. Three years after attaining independence from British rule, in
January 1950 the Supreme Court of India was inaugurated. The Supreme Court is at the
apex of the judicial system.123 Its powers include broad original and appellate
jurisdiction. The President, in consultation with the Prime Minister, appoints Justices of
the Court. At the state level, a hierarchal step below the Supreme Court, are the High
Courts, one each located in each State in India. The justices of the High Court are
appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
122 India is a constitutional democracy, comprised of twenty eight states, six Union Territories, and the
Territory of Delhi (capital of India). It has a parliamentary system styled in the fashion of the British
system. Its bicameral legislature consists of the upper house, or the Rajya Sabha, and the lower house, the
Lok Sabha. Legislative power rests primarily with the Lok Sabha. The Prime Minister is the effective
executive, though there is also a President who has limited powers. India’s structure is explicitly federal,
but with features that emphasize the power of the center over subnational units. The twenty eight states, as
well as Delhi and the Union Territory of Pondicherry have elected (unicameral) legislatures; the Chief
Minister of each state is the chief executive. Each state also has a Governor, although appointed by the
President, the Governor of each state works under the guidance and direction of the Prime Minister.
123 India has approximately 10,000 courts: 1 Supreme Court, 18 High Courts, 3,150 District Level Courts,
4,816 Munsif/Magistrate Courts and 1,964 Magistrate II and equivalent courts. BIBEK DEBROY,
GOVERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND REFORM IN CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA 344 (edited by Jean-
Jacques Dethier,Boston, Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), available at
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/saslib/Chap12%20Debroy.pdf (last viewed March 25,
2006).
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and the state’s Governor. Similar to the situation at the Union (or Central) level, the
State’s Chief Minister can influence the Governor’s advice. State High Courts also have
both original and appellate jurisdiction, and they oversee the work of all courts within the
State. Each State is divided into judicial districts, presided over by District/Sessions
Judge. This is the court of original jurisdiction for civil and criminal matters. Below this
court are lesser courts in each State that hear civil and criminal matters.124
Inclusion of a specialized Cyber Infringement Court system within the existing
court structure could be accomplished in India if the system is flexible and adaptable to
change. India has a history of accommodating changes to its legal system. Prior to the
British occupancy, India had a localized “panchayat” system of resolving disputes.125
Panchayats, typically constituted of five respected village elders, dealt with each issue of
contention within the local community as a discrete matter. Social, cultural and religious
considerations played a dominant role in the decisions of the elders. This localized and
informal system of dispensing justice was far removed from the institutional courts
established by the British.
India adapted well to the system of centralized courts and the tradition of common
law introduced by the British. Since gaining independence from the British, India has
retained the centralized court system introduced by the British, but has also recently
reverted back to a form of the “panchayat” system. Lok Adalats- literally translated to
124 Pawan Chaudhary ‘Manmauji,’ Indian Judicial System, Its Nature & Structure and Distinctions Between
Law and Justice, in INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM, NEED AND DIRECTIONS OF REFORM, 25-27 (S.P. Verma
ed., Kanishka Publishers New Delhi) (2004).
125 S.N MATHUR, NYAYA PANCHAYATS AS INSTRUMENTS OF JUSTICE, 25-27 (Concept Publishing
Company New Delhi) (1997).
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mean “people’s courts,” have now been established to encourage alternate modes of
dispute resolution.126
In addition, India has moved a mere step away from specialized courts. Special
tribunals have now become a feature of the Indian judicial system: the Central
Administrative Tribunal, State Administrative Tribunal, Income Tax Appellate Tribunals,
Family Courts and Labor Courts have also been established to ease court delays.127
Under the present form of the IT Act of 2000 certain cyber crime cases (including
unauthorized access to computers, unauthorized downloading of copyrighted data, and
launching virus attacks) are to be decided by adjudicating officers appointed by the
Central government. The adjudicating officer is required to be either a judge of the Indian
High Court, or be a member of the Indian Legal Service for a minimum period of three
years. The IT Act of 2000 also mandates that the adjudicating officers are to have
exclusive jurisdiction, to the express exclusion of civil courts, for matters which an
adjudicating officer is empowered by the IT Act of 2000 to determine. Appeals from
such cases are to be heard by the Presiding officer of the Cyber Regulations Appellate
Tribunal (“Cyber Tribunals”) that is constituted under the IT Act of 2000.128
126 Over 300,000 Cases Pending in Supreme Court, NEWKERALA.COM, February 27, 2006, available at
htp://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=17210 (last viewed April 9, 2006). See also
infra note 59.
127 Id.
128 THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, Section 46 et seq. See also Y.K. SINGH, CYBER CRIME
AND LAW 235 (Shree Publishers and Distributors) (2005). Unfortunately, establishment of the Cyber
Tribunal languished, and for a period of two years after the passage of the IT Act on October 2000, the
Indian government had not yet exercised its powers of establishing the Cyber Tribunal, nor appointed the
adjudicating officers. Ultimately, students of the Asian School of Cyber Laws filed a Public Interest
Litigation in the Bombay High Court to compel the government to establish the Cyber Tribunals. The
petitioners contended that they wrote letters almost a year ago to the Indian Ministry of Information
Technology and the Ministry of Law, asking them to rectify this defect. Apparently no action was taken by
these ministries, forcing the petitioners to file suit in the Indian High Court. Ruling for the petitioners, on
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October 9, 2002 the High Court chastised the government for the undue delay, and directed it to expedite
the process of setting up of these enforcement agencies. Following this, the Central Government of India
directed that the IT Secretaries of each state and Union territory should be appointed as adjudicating
officers. See, Adjudicating Officers for Cyber Crimes Appointed in India, ASIAN SCHOOL OF CYBER
LAWS, available at http://www.asianlaws.org/cyberlaw/archives/10_02_adj.htm (last viewed April 10,
2006). See also Rajneesh De and Stanley Glancy, IT Act Languishes Thanks to Government Negligence,
EXPRESS COMPUTER, August 26, 2002, available at
http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20020826/cover.shtml (last viewed April 10, 2006).
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Given (1) the adaptability of Indians to accommodate change to their legal
system, evidenced by India’s history; (2) the absolute necessity of finding alternatives to
India’s overburdened and inefficient courts; (3) the need to serve and support India’s
technology industry (which is instrumental in strengthening India’s economy and is
predicted to move India into one of the foremost economic powers in the world) by
instituting appropriate enforcement mechanism that deal with violations; (4) the strength
of India’s economy and its ability to support the industry that is causing the economic
upturn; and (5) the numerous advantages that specialized courts would offer not only in
terms of data protection, but also in avoiding any further burdening of the existing court
system, specialized Cyber Infringement Courts must be adopted in India. The specialized
courts of Thailand, and the US, and to a limited extent the courts in Italy, are instructive
to India with regard to the issues of jurisdiction, court composition and procedural issues.
ii. Features of Thailand, US, and Italy’s Specialized Courts
Specialized courts in Thailand and the US are valuable models for India:
Thailand is a developing economy, much like India. Its experience with the expense and
infrastructural changes associated with establishment of specialized courts is especially
instructive. The US experience with specialized courts is important to the discussion
since it has a long history of such courts handling a variety of matters such as probate, tax
and family relations. The courts in the US are constituted in various ways, and the
experience gained from institutions in the US that have already gone beyond the
experimental stage is especially valuable. With regard to these two nations, Thailand and
the US, particular attention is given to a study of jurisdiction of the specialized court,
composition or constitution of the court, and procedural features that enhance the
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efficiency of the courts. The Italian specialized court is instructive for limited purposes:
the multi-dimensional roles the judges undertake, and the variety of subject matters
handled by these courts sheds light on the possible variant roles of specialized courts.
(a) Specialized Intellectual Property Courts in Thailand
Although Thailand recognized the importance of intellectual property rights as a
necessity of trade and commerce with other nations, enforcement of the intellectual
property rights remained a problem until promulgation of legislation in 1996, the Act for
the Establishment of and Procedure for the Intellectual Property and International Trade
Court (“IPIT Act”).129 In 1997 Thailand established and inaugurated the Intellectual
Property and International Trade Court (“IPIT Court”) authorized by the IPIT Act.130 A
separate and specialized court of original jurisdiction, the goal of the IPIT Court is to
provide enhanced intellectual property enforcement. The IPIT Court employs specially
trained judges, its own rules and procedures to expedite the processing of cases (such as
hearings without adjournments), and equitable remedies such as preliminary
injunctions.131
129 Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court
B.E. 2539 (1996) (“IPIT Act”), passed by the National Assembly and promulgated in the Government
Gazette on 25 October 1996, available at http://www.skandiproperty.com/Act for the Establishment of and
Procedure.pdf (last viewed August 2, 2006). Under the IPIT Act, a Royal Decree was issued to inaugurate
the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court on 1 December 1997.
130 Id. See also, Andrea Morgan, TRIPS to Thailand: the Act For the Establishment of and Procedure for
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 795, 800, 824 (March 2000).
131 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec. 19, 27, 30; see also Rules 12-19 of the Rules for IPIT Cases.
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The IPIT Act does not limit the IPIT Court's jurisdiction to only intellectual
property and international trade cases.132 In fact, with regard to criminal matters, where a
single act gives rise to several offenses, such extended jurisdiction is mandatory; where
several related offenses are filed as a single charge, the IPIT Court’s jurisdiction is
discretionary as to those offenses which would not ordinarily fall to it.133
With regard to the composition of the court, a panel of three specially trained
judges of the IPIT Court is established for the purpose of hearing cases assigned to
them.134 Two of the judges are ‘career’ judges, and one is an “associate judge.” 135
Career judges are required to have competence in the intellectual property – and
international trade – areas of the law.136 Associate judges are experts in the fields of
intellectual property (and international trade).137 Associate judges are often attorneys
who specialize in these fields; they are appointed for a term of five years.138 In order to
gain additional expertise in the field, the IPIT Court is authorized to delegate the
132 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec. 7.
133 Id., Sec. 35, 36. Section 35 provides that "[i]n a criminal charge where a single act violates several
offences and one of offences falls within the jurisdiction of the intellectual property and international trade
court, the court shall also accept other offences for adjudication." (Emphasis added). Id. Section 36 states
that [i]n a criminal case where several related offences are filed in the same charge, and some of the
offences are not within the jurisdiction of the intellectual property and international trade court, the court
may accept all offences for adjudication or reject any one or more of the offences which falls outside its
jurisdiction so that the prosecutor may file a new charge with the competent court. In reaching its decision,
the court shall regard convenience and fairness as its prime consideration.” (Emphasis added). Id.
134 Id., Sec. 19.
135 Morgan, supra note 131.
136 Id.
137 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec. 15.
138 Id.
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examination of evidence to the officers of another court. In addition, the IPIT Court has
the authority to call on any knowledgeable person or expert.139
Two procedural features of Thailand’s IPIT Courts are notable: first, the power
vested in the IPIT Court to promulgate its own rules of court, and second, the expeditious
processing of cases. As to the first procedural aspect, the Chief Justice of the IPIT Court
is empowered by the Act to formulate and issue the Rules of Court for the IPIT
Courts.140 These include procedural and evidentiary rules.141 Where the Rules of the
Court are silent, the Civil Procedural Code and the Criminal Procedural Code of
Thailand provide the default rules. Granting the Chief Justice this power means that the
Court can adopt new rules, or change rules as and when necessary, without undue delay.
Inherent in this innovative system is that there is great sensitivity in the procedure of the
Court due to which the Court can evolve and respond in an appropriate and timely
manner.142
The second procedural feature of Thailand’s IPIT Courts attempts to remove
unnecessary delay and provide expedition remedies to the litigants. The Act mandates
that hearings proceed without adjournment.143 It also requires that the IPIT Court render
139 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Section 31. See also Morgan, supra note 131, at 800, 827-28 (March
2000), stating, in part, that “[p]rior to the establishment of the IPIT Court, intellectual property cases were
heard by non-specialized judges, which often resulted in misapplications of the law and, moreover,
misunderstandings of basic intellectual property concepts.”
140 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec. 30.
141 Id. The only limit on this power is that the rules cannot infringe on the rights of a defendant in a
criminal case.
142 See, Morgan, supra note 131, at 829-30.
143 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec 27. An exception is created in case of “unavoidable necessity.” Id.
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written judgment promptly.144 This IPIT Court procedure starkly contrasts with the
standard practice of Thailand’s civil courts which hear each case for only one day per
month.145
Further, in the interest of expedience in resolution, appeals to the decisions of the
IPIT Courts may be made directly to the Supreme Court of Thailand.146 To ensure that
the Supreme Court of Thailand has the expertise necessary to rule on these appeals, the
Act dictates that the Supreme Court establish a specialized division to hear IPIT Court
appeals.147
(b) Specialized Courts in the US
The US has an extensive range of Federal and state specialized courts. Tax,
bankruptcy, probate and family courts are but a few of such specialized courts. Some
courts in the US share concurrent jurisdiction with other specialized or generalized
courts. For example, Probate Courts, one of the models of specialized courts in the US,
share concurrent jurisdiction with both specialized family courts as well as with general
courts in the US. In other words, matters which fall within the jurisdiction of probate
courts in the US may also fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of family or general
courts. General courts are concurrently responsible for supervision of decedents' estates,
conservatorships, guardianships of minors and incompetence of persons; family courts in
the US are concurrently responsible for removal and termination of parents and
144 Id.
145 See, Morgan supra note 131, at 830.
146 IPIT Act, supra note 130, at Sec. 38.
147 Id. Sec 43.
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guardians, and custody issues.148 This system permits a general court to hear certain
specialized matters, and vice versa. It is questionable whether such concurrent
jurisdiction is desirable, and whether it may not be more efficient and concrete for the
litigants if such issues are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. On the
other hand, it may be more frustrating and time consuming for the litigant where certain
matters related to a case are heard by one court, other matters related to the same case
transferred to a specialized court.
The numerous Federal, state and administrative specialized courts are constituted
in different ways. Typically, a single judge (versus a panel of judges as in the case of
Thailand and Italy) hears cases in the US. The tax courts are used for illustrative purposes
in this paper. Tax law is a particularly complex area of the law. Creation of the
specialized Tax Court in the US mitigated the burden on the general courts to adjudicate
issues in this specialized field. The Tax Court is comprised of nineteen judges, each
appointed for a fifteen-year term of office. Ten other special trial judges are attached to a
system that is parallel to the “small claims” court system- jurisdiction lies in the special
trial judge where the amount in controversy is less than a certain sum of money. Trials
are conducted by a single judge or by a commissioner appointed by the chief judge.149
Appointing judges to a limited term (a term of fifteen years in the context of the
US Tax Court) is advisable if the area of law is unlikely to be a permanent fixture in the
148 CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE AND RESEARCH
PROGRAM, SPECIALIZED COURTS: A CONCEPT PAPER (June 25, 1996) (“CEELI”), Section VII.B.1,
available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/conceptpapers/speccourts/spc1.html (last viewed
April 9, 2006).
149 Id. at Section II.
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legal landscape. If the number of cases in that area of the law is subject either to
fluctuation such that it may remain dormant for long periods of time, or may disappear
over time, it is wise to appoint judges for a limited term.150 With regard to procedural
matters, the US model of a “fast track” court system adopted by certain jurisdictions is an
important and innovative feature in terms of court efficiency. California adopted the
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act to ensure the timely disposition of civil and criminal
cases in its court systems. The statute provides for judicial supervision of litigation,
ensuring through an oversight and sanction process that cases progress through the
system without undue delay.151
(b) Specialized Intellectual Property Courts in Italy
After years of debate, in June 1993 Italy adopted a system of specialized courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over intellectual property matters.152 Twelve specialized
courts are established in specific cities and establish the territorial limit of each division’s
jurisdiction. These specialized courts are a special section of the Italian Court of
Appeal.153 Each division of the specialized court consists of a panel of at least six judges
who have specific intellectual property skills. Each case is heard and decided by a panel
150 Id. at Section I.E.4.
151 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68600 et seq. recommended that the Judicial Council of California adopt rules
effective July 1, 1991, to be used by all delay reduction courts. The guiding principle was that litigation
should require only that amount of time reasonably necessary for pleadings, discovery and preparation, and
that any additional elapsed time constitutes delay which should be eliminated. In part, the rules established
a case differentiation classification system based on the relative complexity of cases- longer periods being
granted for the timely disposition of more complex cases.
152 Margherita Bari, IP-Centric Courts Equal a Welcomed Change in Italy, available at
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/2df80680-9b4b-488b-8d84-
cee97b391f66.cfm (last viewed April 5, 2006).
153 Id.
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of three judges. Each branch of the specialized court is headed by a “president.”154
Provided it will not cause any delay in the handling of intellectual property cases, the
judges assigned to the specialized division are required to deal with subjects other than
intellectual property issues.155 This particular feature is attractive in that overburdened
courts of general jurisdiction are well served if the specialized courts handles some of
their caseload in times when the specialized court is able to do so.
India’s specialized Cyber Infringement Courts should draw from the experiences
of the courts established in Thailand, the US and Italy. Some of the more desirable
jurisdictional, compositional and procedural features of these systems are recommended
below in the Indian context.
iii. Proposed Features of India’s Cyber Infringement Courts
While specific characteristics of the Cyber Infringements Courts are
critical to their success in India, equally important is the public’s ability to access justice
through these courts. India’s specialized Cyber Infringement Courts would ideally be
located in strategic locations so as to provide reasonable access to litigants. Given
India’s jurisdictional structure where there is one Supreme Court at the apex and a High
Court in each State, at the very least one specialized court must be located in each State,
and several others in each State strategically placed in proportion to the population
density and anticipated flow of cyber infringement cases.156 Although the expense
associated with the creation of such a network of specialized courts may appear
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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prohibitive, India’s economic outlook, and specifically the growth of the technology
industry not only supports this judicial system to, but indeed mandates it.157 Specific
features related to the jurisdiction, constitution and procedures of the specialized Cyber
Infringement Courts are identified below.
Jurisdiction of India’s specialized Cyber Infringement Courts: Two subject-
matter jurisdictional questions need to be addressed in instituting a specialized court: (1)
whether jurisdiction of a specialized court should be limited to a only those cases that
clearly fall within the specialized area of law, or whether it should be more inclusive to
include related cases, and (2) whether the court should be a court of general subject-
matter jurisdiction during times when its case load so permits. Both questions are
answered in the affirmative in the Indian context.
With regard to the first “related issue” question, as has been the experience with
Thailand specialized intellectual property courts, the specialized court may be faced with
a situation where either (a) subject areas related to intellectual property - such as data
privacy- are sought by claimants to be settled in the specialized court, (b) a single act
gives rise to several offenses, only one of which is in the jurisdiction of specialized court,
or (c) several offenses arise from related acts, including one under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the specialized court.158 In such instance the Indian specialized Cyber
Infringement Court should have the power to extend its jurisdiction and exercise it over
all the offenses. This flexibility would offer the benefit of certainty, as well as expedient
157 Supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
158 Supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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resolution of the matters, all under one roof. The judge assigned to the specialized cyber
infringement case would be familiar with the matter, and would be efficient in its
disposition. If the related matter required it, the specialized cyber infringement court
should have the flexibility, power and resources to retain an advisor. The advisor could
be another jurist assigned temporarily to the specialized cyber infringement court. In the
alternative and in the interest of time, an independent consultant could be retained –
similar to what has been provided for in Thailand’s IPIT Courts.159
The advantages of this jurisdictional solution in India are numerous. The already
over-burdened general courts in India would have some of the case load taken off them
entirely by the specialized court. The litigant would be served well in terms of time and
cost since removal from one court to another is procedurally complicated and inherently
time consuming. Further, the judge hearing the specialized matter would already be
familiar with the case, and is in the best position to adjudicate it in its entirety. Where
specialized consultation is necessary, the specialized judge would make that judgment
call efficiently and resolve the issue in the best manner possible.
A related concern of jurisdictional consideration is one of concurrent jurisdiction.
Contrary to the experience of US specialized courts, concurrent jurisdiction issues should
be planned for and addressed in a manner that draws cases away from the general courts,
and in to the Cyber Infringement Courts.160 A concurrent jurisdiction problem is
certainly conceivable within the broad category of cyber infringement or intellectual
159 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 1490 and accompanying text. US Probate courts offer an example of concurrent
jurisdiction, which offer the benefit to litigants of time efficiency by having all matters heard by one court,
even if that matter does not fall specifically within the specialization of the court.
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property cases, especially if the specialized court accepts “related” matters, as prescribed
above. It is foreseeable that the related matter which would ordinarily fall within the
jurisdiction of the generalized court, is now heard by the specialized court as a “related”
matters. A concurrent jurisdiction problem, where the specialized court took away
related matters that may have ordinarily fallen within the generalized court’s jurisdiction,
would not be entirely undesirable in the Indian context for two reasons: first, the already
over-loaded general jurisdiction courts would benefit from having matters taken away
from them; second, specialist judges would be well served to have continuing exposure
to matters outside their field of specialization.
The second subject matter jurisdiction issue pertains to the optimum use of
specialized courts. In the interest of reducing the load on the already over-extended
courts of general jurisdiction, India’s specialized courts should take on matters of purely
general subject matter in lax times or when the court docket permits it, as does the Italian
specialized court.161 This “cross-pollination” would also address, to some extent, the
concern that specialist judges may adopt an elitist attitude and see themselves as
hierarchically superior to the generalist judge.162
Composition of the Indian Court: The Indian specialized Cyber Infringement
Courts must determine three issues vital to the constitution of its courts: (1) the
qualifications of the judges appointed to its specialized courts; (2) the number of judges
designated to each matter, and (3) the term of appointment of each judge. The first and
second questions are inter-related to a degree; if the Indian specialized courts retain
161 Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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judges with expertise in intellectual property issues, one judge should be assigned to
each case. However, if expert judges are not retained, then perhaps a panel of judges
with mixed levels of competence should be assigned to each case.
In answering the first question, provided that India has a sufficient number of
experts who can serve on the judiciary, it seems that Thailand’s model of combining
“competent” career judges with “expert” associate judges demonstrates an inefficient
system for India.163 India has been a leader in technology issues, and should have no
dearth of such expertise. It should not be difficult for India to constitute its specialized
courts with a judiciary that has proficiency in intellectual property. In the event that a
particular issue is beyond the expertise of the specialized judge, the specialized courts
should have the authority to bring in an advisor to inform on this specific issue.164
Should the recommendation be followed and expert judges be retained in the
Cyber Infringement Courts, then the answer to the second question regarding the number
of judges assigned to each case, follows logically. While meeting the goal of infusing its
overburdened system with additional judges to lessen the burden on the courts, India
must remain conscious of the expense associated with establishing specialized courts and
hiring competent judges to staff them. Assigning each matter to a panel of judges (as is
the case with Thailand’s IPIT Courts and the Italian specialized courts), versus one judge
162 CEELI, supra note 149, at pp. 18, 19.
163 Supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
63
would mean incurring the cost of hiring a larger number of judges to staff each case.165
If the Cyber Infringement Courts judiciary is comprised of experts, one such specialist
judge is well equipped to hear each case. This is essentially the model followed by the
specialized courts in the USA.166
The third issue India needs to address in terms of constitution of its courts is the
term of office to be held by each judge. Appointing judges to a limited term (a term of
fifteen years in the context of the US Tax Court; a term of five years in Thailand’s IPIT
courts) is advisable if the area of law is unlikely to be a permanent fixture in the legal
landscape.167 If the number of cases in that area of the law is subject either to fluctuation
such that it may remain dormant for long periods of time, or may disappear over time, it
is wise to appoint judges for a limited term.168 The field of intellectual property,
although subject to constant change and evolution, is unlikely to disappear or fluctuate to
any significant extent. However, if this is a factor in establishing lifetime tenure for
judges, it can be addressed in India anticipating and permitting flexibility in the
placement of these specialized judges. Specialized judges in India can be appointed with
an explicit understanding that they may be re-located to other courts, including general
165 Both Thailand and Italy’s specialized intellectual property courts have a panel of three judges assigned
to each case. See supra note 135 and accompanying text pertaining to Thailand’s IPIT courts. In Italy,
each division of the specialized court consists of a panel of at least six judges who have specific intellectual
property skills. Each case is heard and decided by a panel of three judges. Supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
166 Supra note 150, and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 151 and accompanying text describing the term of appointment of US Tax courts. See
also supra note 139 describing that Thailand’s associate judges appointed to its IPIT Courts are retained
for a term of 5 years.
168 See supra note 151, citing CEELI, supra note 149 at Section I.E.4.
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courts. Given the historic trend of an ever-increasing burden on the general courts in
India, it is certain that the re-location of the specialized judge to a general court would be
welcome relief to the backlogged general courts.
To summarize the issue of constitution of the courts, since India’s overburdened
system requires the infusion of additional and new judges to lessen the burden on the
court system, yet must maintain relatively low costs in doing so, India should: (a) hire
career judges with expertise in intellectual property matters (as opposed to Thailand’s
system of expert associate judges, and competent career judges), (b) assign one career
judge to each case brought before the specialized cyber infringement court (versus
Thailand’s model of a panel of three, consisting of two career and one associate judge,
and Italy’s model of a panel of three judges), (c) offer lifetime tenure for the specialized
judge, to avoid the expense related to having judges rotate through the system, (d)
following Thailand’s example, delegate the examination of evidence to the officers of
another court, provided that their dockets permit such delegation, and (e) retain any
knowledgeable person or expert to gain further insight into the particular intellectual
property issue (as does Thailand). 169
Court Procedures: Two specific features related to court procedures are
recommended for India’s Cyber Infringement Courts: (1) rules of court specific to the
specialized courts, and (2) an expedited process for resolution of cases.
Thailand’s example is helpful to address the first issue. In Thailand, the Chief
Justice of its specialized IPIT court can promulgate the rules of court. This power means
169 Supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
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that the Court can adopt new rules, or change rules as and when necessary, without
undue delay. Inherent in this innovative system is that there is greater responsiveness in
the procedure of the Court due to which the Court can evolve in a responsive fashion.170
This feature is exceptionally significant in the Indian context, where bureaucratic delays
frustrate the process.171 India’s specialized Cyber Infringement Courts must be allowed
to evolve with their needs, and this power to adopt new rules or make changes to existing
ones must lie with the court. However, rather than place all power in the hands of one
individual, a panel of judges of the specialized court in India can be selected as court
administrators to formulate and then approve such new or additional procedures.
Expediency in resolution of the cases is one of the main reasons specialized
courts have been recommended for India in this paper. The US model of a “fast track”
court system, and to some extent Thailand’s model for expedient resolution of
intellectual property matters instruct this second procedural issue.172 California’s Trial
Court Delay Reduction Act to ensure the timely disposition of civil and criminal cases in
its court systems, which provides for judicial supervision of litigation, ensuring through
an oversight and sanction process that cases progress through the system without undue
delay, is an important feature for India to adopt.173 Thailand’s IPIT Courts attempts to
remove unnecessary delay and provide expedition remedies to the litigants by requiring
170 Supra note 143 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 42 and 129 for illustrations of the inefficiency in the Indian bureaucratic process.
172 See supra note 152 describing California’s “fast track” system of administering cases in order to
monitor, guide and expedite their progress through the legal system. See also supra notes 144, 145
describing IPIT Court procedures designed to expeditiously handle cases.
173 See supra note 152.
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that hearings proceed without adjournment, and that once the matter is adjudicated the
IPIT Court render written judgment promptly.174 These features from the California and
Thai systems are not only desirable for India, but indeed absolutely essential. This
system is not entirely new to India since India has, in fact, adopted a fast track system in
its general courts.175 The specialized Cyber Infringement Courts must adopt an
expedited process, requiring not only a general rule that cases be resolve expeditiously,
but specific provisions for such timely and efficient processing of cases.
Another aspect of expedient resolution of matters is establishment of a procedure
of direct appeals. In Thailand, in the interest of expedience, appeals to the decisions of
the IPIT Courts may be made directly to the Supreme Court of Thailand.176 To ensure
that the Supreme Court of Thailand has the expertise necessary to rule on these appeals,
the Act dictates that the Supreme Court establish a specialized division to hear IPIT
Court appeals.177 Given the backlog at the Indian Supreme Court it may appear at first
blush to be questionable whether Thailand’s example of referring cases directly to the
Supreme Court would serve much benefit in the Indian context. However, when one
factors in the bottleneck at the appellate court level in India, it is seen as imperative for
cases involving data protection (and generally intellectual property cases) have direct
access to the ultimate judicial authority, the Indian Supreme Court. In order to ensure
174 See supra note 1445, 145.
175 Nod to 20 fast track courts, 4 Lok Adalats, THE TRIBUNE, March 14, 2005, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050314/delhi.htm (last viewed April 23, 2006); see also V.
Venkatesan, For Fast Track Justice, FRONTLINE, Volume 18, Issue 14, July 7, 2001, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1814/18140910.htm (last viewed April 23, 2006).
176 Supra note 147.
177 Supra note 148.
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expertise in the Supreme Court, a specialized division within the Supreme Court can be
established to hear appeals from the specialized court, as with Thailand’s IPIT Courts.178
Should it not be feasible for the Indian Supreme Court to have this specialized division
for intellectual property matters, India’s Supreme Court should be empowered to retain
experts to advise the Court, if necessary, once again as exemplified by Thailand.179
Expedient resolution envisions special procedures that provide shortcuts to the
present dysfunctional and inefficient court system in India. Should specialized courts be
adopted, they must absorb the successful features of other systems. The
recommendations listed above draw extensively from the Thai system which exemplifies
the application of specialized courts in a developing nation such as India, and the US
system in which specialized courts have not only withstood the test of time, but have also
been adopted in various permutations across varied areas of the law. This cross-sectional
critical examination of the various specialized courts in the Thai and US jurisdictions
offers India an opportunity to adopt an appropriate legal system to effectively enforce
data protection laws and resolve its looming data protection crisis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Data protection is an issue that is gaining increasing importance as our trans-
national exchange of private information grows. While the EU has adopted stringent
legislation to protect data, and the US has reached agreement with the EU to offer
protection, the Indian laws remain unsatisfactory. It is anticipated that India will soon
enact legislation which will provide acceptable protection to private data. The issue that
178 Supra note 147 and accompanying text.
179 Supra note 140.
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remains to be dealt with in the Indian context is, unfortunately, far larger than the
enactment of strong protectionist laws. Laws act as a deterrent to wrongful conduct if
they are applied with certainty and speed: both sadly deficient in the Indian judicial
system. Unless addressed, the systemic problems of enforcement in India, and
specifically of unresolved cases due to court delays, will continue to render India’s data
protection laws inadequate.
Cyber Infringement Courts, specialized courts with jurisdiction over all
intellectual property and data protection issues, are a necessary solution to India’s
enforcement problems. India must expediently adopt this system of specialized courts in
order to render adequate protection to data, and maintain its growing presence in the
global technology arena.
